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ABSTRACT
In close cooperation and consultation with a US nuclear power utility, a model was
constructed of maintenance in a nuclear power plant.
The model was designed to enable experimentation with policy decisions such as
staffing levels, priorities for doing maintenance, and desired backlog levels in order
to determine which policies are best for the profitability and safety of the plant.
Experimentation with the model verifies the importance of preventive
maintenance in insuring that fewer pieces of equipment become defective. The
model further shows that many seemingly beneficial policies, such as requiring that
the corrective maintenance backlog be reduced in a certain amount of time, can
actually be quite harmful if they do not entail hiring additional workers or
increasing productivity to deal with the increased maintenance demands.
It was found that the model as a language and tool for conversation about
maintenance at nuclear power plants was quite effective. This role in stimulating
and focusing conversation and fostering understanding is perhaps more important
than the computer-based model itself.
Thesis Supervisor: John S. Carroll
Title: Professor of Behavioral and Policy Sciences

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank the MIT International Program for Enhanced Nuclear
Power Plant Safety, and the MIT Organizational Learning Center for providing
funding for the two semesters that I worked on this project. Without their
assistance, it is quite doubtful that I would have been able to work on the project.
Thanks go to the MIT International Program for Enhanced Nuclear Power
Plant Safety for funding the six trips that I made to Tyler Headquarters and Tyler
One in building the model.
I would also like to thank those at Tyler Power, who were generous of their
time and in allowing me access to information. They were willing to spend time on
a project very different from what they had experienced before, and were willing to
give the methodology, as well as Professor Carroll and me, the benefit of the doubt.
I would especially like to thank Professor John Carroll, both for his guidance
during the project and for providing me the opportunity to participate in this
research in the first place. I could not have hoped for a better thesis advisor.
Finally, without the love and encouragement of my parents, it is doubtful
that I would have even believed that I might one day attend an institution like MIT.
This work is dedicated to them.

Table of Contents
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Chapter VIII
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Works Cited
Background and Introduction
Project Thesis
Nuclear Power and Maintenance -- A Primer
Nuclear Power
Maintenance
Maintenance in Context of Nuclear Power
Modeling Methodology
Introduction to System Dynamics
What Can the Model Do?
Responses to Project Methods
Structure of the Model
Modeling Methodology
Table 1 - Summary of Initial Conditions
Policy Analysis with Model
Base Case
Half Target Corrective Maintenance Backlog
Double SRT Maximum Backlog
No SRT
Drastic Work Force Reduction
Half SRT Maximum Backlog
Increased PMO
Sensitivity Analysis
Policy Experimentation: A Summary
Conclusions
Reflections on the Model
Reflections on the Modeling Process
Future Possibilities
Closing Remarks
Equipment Sector
Model Equations
Tyler Meeting
Page 7
p. 8
p. 14
p. 15
p. 15
p. 18
p. 20
p. 21
p. 21
p. 24
p. 25
p. 33
p. 3 8
p. 45
p. 47
p. 47
p. 52
p. 55
p. 58
p. 66
p. 68
p. 71
p. 75
p. 83
p. 85
p. 85
p. 88
p. 89
p. 91
p. 93
p. 95
p. 98
p. 101
Chapter I - Background and Introduction
Background
From small businesses to multi-billion dollar corporations, from industry to
universities, organizations can be said to be the cornerstones of our society. Though
their structures are often easy to understand, their behavior is not -- the mental
models that most people have of organizations are either not rich enough to capture
the major principles of the structure of organizations, or they are simply wrong.
In terms of social programs, this lack of understanding results not only in
inefficiency, but in programs that are either ineffective or actually harmful; when
potentially hazardous technologies are involved, this same misunderstanding can
result in less effective maintenance, poor judgment on how to correct problems, and
even loss of life. Developing tools to help us understand how organizations
function, and to guide us in improving their performance, is critical to our
economy, our society, and even to life itself.
Why Build a Model of Maintenance for Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs)?
Deregulation Comes to Power Production
With the deregulation of the airline industry and then the telephone system,
deregulation of the electrical power system was perhaps only to be expected. People
have decided that governmentally regulated areas of commerce are doomed to be
more inefficient and expensive for consumers than a competitive marketplace
would allow. Electrical power producers, like Bell Telephone officials over a decade
ago, argued that there in certain industries a natural monopoly should exist for
technical reasons. The California experiment disproved this idea when the power
grid was opened to all independent power producers (IPPs) wishing to come on line;
the experiment demonstrated that there can be some agreement about who uses
common transmission and distribution lines and at what cost, and that often IPPs
can produce power at cheaper rates than the giant power producers.
Nuclear Power Deregulation Possibly Fraught with Dangers
With deregulation of the electrical power supply industry already underway,
companies which generate electricity with NPPs find themselves evaluating the cost
of their electricity compared with other types of plants. Although some would deny
it, others in the nuclear industry evaluate their true cost of producing electricity
significantly higher than the 1 cent per kilowatt hour so often quoted; one
maintenance manager evaluated his plant as producing electricity at closer to 6.5
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cents per kilowatt hour (1) -- placing it at double the cost of many coal and natural
gas combined cycle stations, and well within striking range of some types of
renewable energy. Despite their argument for decades that nuclear power would
provide "power too cheap too meter," they are increasingly admitting that nuclear
power has been and still is a creature of the government. When subsidies disappear
and they are forced to compete on an equal footing with other forms of power
generation, they are worried that they will not survive.
When we think of the case of a 1300MW NPP in Florida employing 900
people just down the road from a 1300MW coal-fired plant employing 35, the
magnitude of nuclear power's problem becomes clear (2). And this is not including
the costs of "disposing" of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive wastes, the costs
of decommissioning, and the costs of a possible accident, which a utility may or may
not be forced to bear.
NPP power generators are looking for ways to cut costs. They have
developed outage maintenance teams which travel from plant-to-plant, which has
the advantage of being cheaper than bringing on outage workers from the outside
and also helps insure that the outage workers will be more familiar with the plant.
They are working to decrease the length of planned outages and the frequency of
forced outages, both of which at best mean that plant is not operating to repay the
initial investment or the current salaries of workers, and often expensive power
must be purchased from other utilities or expensive forms of electrical generation
must be used. Other than outages, the only major cost which can be cut is the cost of
staff.
Staff primarily consists of Engineering, Operations, and Maintenance. The
largest group is generally Maintenance, consisting not only of the actual
maintenance workers, but of the planners and schedulers. Operations really cannot
be cut -- the size of the operations staff is mandated by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), and is pretty much identical from plant to plant (3).
The willingness of NPPs to experiment with the way maintenance is done
seems greater now than ever before, given the number of nuclear power plants
(NPPs) adopting organizational changes. Moreover, NPPs are not just thinking
about cutting maintenance staff. They are actively doing so.
In a coal or gas-fired plant, poor maintenance simply means less availability
for electricity generation and decreased profits. In an NPP, poor maintenance can
have disastrous results.
What rationale, then, are NPPs using to determine how many maintenance
workers are the right number? How do they know how low to cut? When asked
this question, one maintenance manager responded , "It is very complex. We don't
really know what the right number of workers is. We just plan to cut until we see
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that something undesirable has happened" (4).
The reason for a model of maintenance is to present an alternative to this
method of decision making.
Before discussing in further detail the kinds of questions one might like to see
a model of maintenance address, it is helpful to look at the utility I worked with on
this project.
Introduction
Tyler Power and Work Process Innovation
Over the course of this project, which began in January 1995 and has lasted
until January 1996, I have worked with Prof. John Carroll of the Sloan School of
Management at MIT to model the maintenance process at NPPs operated by Tyler
Power.
MIT has been working with Tyler for the past five years studying their
organization, and this project has been conducted during the fifth year of the
continuing study.
One reason why Tyler is an interesting organization to work with is that it
has consistently sought to innovate in responding to outside pressures. Its response
to the pressures of deregulation is similarly innovative.
What Type of Innovation Has Been Introduced?
The Single Resource Team, or SRT, is an innovation by Tyler Power in the
structure of the NPP maintenance organization. SRT is an interdisciplinary team
which does its own planning and scheduling on the spot and thus returns pieces of
equipment to service much faster than the standard maintenance organization.
The standard maintenance organization typically handles jobs that are more tricky
and require a detailed plan to accomplish them or a team of specialists, and SRT
generally handles jobs that are easier to schedule and perform.
At the beginning of this study (January 1995), the team was composed of 10
members per shift, with each shift being 12 hours and with the team operating 7
days a week, 24 hours a day. Roughly 6 members of each SRT shift were trained in
Electrical and Instrumentation, and 4 in Mechanical. As of January 1996, the SRT
shift schedule remains essentially the same, but with an average team size of
between 6 and 7 per shift, reduced from 10.
All work orders first come to SRT; SRT decides what it can handle and what
it must pass on. It purports to have clear view of its role: to keep the regular
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maintenance organization from breaking its schedule, and to keep as many work
orders out of the regular maintenance organization as possible (5). We shall later
examine how clear this view really is.
As I have since discovered, those within Tyler are still divided over how SRT
can best accomplish this role -- through concentrating on more difficult tasks, or on
a higher volume of more simple activities (6). This division points out that some
in the organization view SRT's mandate to keep maintenance from breaking
schedule and its mandate to keep work orders out of maintenance as being
contradictory.
Why Was SRT Introduced?
In our first visit to the Work Control Quality Improvement Process (WCQIP),
which was charged with creating and overseeing an innovation in the way
maintenance is done at Tyler Power, we discussed with them their motivations for
seeking change. Those they listed are as follows:
A) Increased worker satisfaction -- workers will be able to expand
professionally by working with those of other disciplines, will be able to do more
actual maintenance work and less paperwork
B) Increased motivation -- a natural result of workers who are more satisfied
with their jobs
C) Increased efficiency -- being able to return equipment to service faster with
the same size workforce requires greater efficiency, and results in a better plant
D) Cost savings -- increased efficiency means more frequent attention can be
given to equipment, meaning that it breaks down less frequently, so fewer man-
hours are required for maintenance (less overtime) and fewer spare parts are
needed; also, with equipment in better condition, forced outages are less likely, and
fewer forced outages directly result in cost savings.
It is interesting to note that the team did not immediately list all of these
reasons, but took about half an hour to bring them up.
Now that we have discussed the need for a model in response to the
pressures of deregulation, and the type of organizational change that Tyler has
undertaken to deal with that pressure, a discussion of the specific goals of the
modeling effort seems in order.
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What are the Specific Goals of the Modeling Project?
Initial Project Goals
In speaking with those in the Work Process Team in January 1995 about what
they would like to better understand and what a model might most help them with,
we jointly came up with several modeling project goals:
A) To better understand maintenance and the relationships to operations,
human resources, safety, quality, and profitability;
B) To compare before and after the WCQIP/SRT, compare the three stations,
and explore more "what if" options, thereby seeing vulnerabilities and
opportunities;
C) To examine the possibilities for new quantitative and qualitative
measures of key issues;
D) To test the System Dynamics modeling process and tools and consider
future uses;
E) To observe how the modeling process stimulates different kinds of
conversations, ideas, and possibilities.
The project has evolved since that January 1995 meeting; therefore, an in-
depth discussion of some of the goals of the model as they now stand seems
appropriate.
Convincing Others of the Value of SRT
Although many at Tyler Power see the SRT innovation as a success, they
would like some way of clearly demonstrating to others the power of the concept.
They plan to develop a small consulting practice to other NPPs, and would like to be
able to show what the client's plant would look like with SRT. Since maintenance
organizations which have existed for a long time tend to be resistant to change, they
believe that something more persuasive than their own statistics would go a long
way in getting other NPPs to adopt the SRT maintenance structure.
A model of NPP maintenance would certainly allow one to carry out
computer-based experiments with maintenance. And by being able create, alter, and
destroy SRT with just a few keystrokes, it becomes possible to show the
ramifications of adopting SRT through a simulation run, which is useful when
people would naturally be hesitant to do the experiments in real life.
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It has also become clear that there are others within Tyler Power who do not
believe that SRT is a good thing. They do not see the same good news in the
statistics that the supporters of SRT do. Frequently, they are in the regular
maintenance department, and would like to have those now assigned to SRT
reallocated to maintenance. They believe that it is time to end the experiment.
There is concern among some supporters of SRT that this camp could grow in
strength and defeat what they think has been a clear success. They would like to be
able to make arguments on behalf of SRT in a more logical, objective, and
persuasive manner.
Maintenance Policy Options
In addition, a model can be useful for those in the maintenance organization
at the NPPs themselves. Policies of different degrees of backlog reduction over
different lengths of time can be examined. Probabilities of forced outage, which
depend on the state of the equipment in the plant, can be better understood.
Changing the priorities in which different categories of maintenance work is done is
also possible.
In short, one can evaluate proposed policies with the model to see their merit
without having to do all experimentation in the real world. It becomes possible to
see which changes, among the many possible, have the greatest impact on the plant.
How Might the Model Be Used?
Possible Applications of the Model
After our most recent visit to Tyler Headquarters, in which we showed the
model structure and output to those involved with the Work Control Process,
several ways were mentioned in which the model might be directly applied:
A) To assist the Work Process Managers at each site to evaluate maintenance
policies, both to determine the effect of proposed policies and to determine which
policies might have the greatest positive impact on the system;
B) As a tool for conversation between those at the sites and Tyler
Headquarters, so that the concerns and ideas of each can be more concrete and can be
evaluated on a more explicit and commonly agreed-upon basis;
C) As a training tool for all workers at the plants, so that they may see how
their function in the system impacts the whole;
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D) To help in marketing the SRT concept outside Tyler Power, in order to
show others the merit of the system, and give them confidence that a reorganization
in the way maintenance is done entails less risk.
HYPOTHESIS
I hypothesize that building a model exacts an intellectual rigor and depth of
understanding of the system not elicited in everyday life, and this heightened
understanding can be used to have more meaningful discussions and to make better
policy.
EXPLANATION OF HYPOTHESIS
Just as it can be said that you haven't truly seen a flower before you've tried to
draw it, it can be said that you haven't truly understood a system before you've tried
to create a model of it.
In everyday life, people have specialized and fragmented duties. They are
not required and frequently do not have the opportunity to gain a holistic view of
the system.
TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS
By interviewing knowledgeable employees in the nuclear industry,
discovering what they see are the essential components of the maintenance system
and how those components interact, it is possible to build a dynamical model of
how maintenance and staffing policies affect both the cost and safety of the plant.
For a good fit with this hypothesis, I would expect that in building the model,
people will be asked to come up with data they do not collect and to view the system
in ways they have never before. I would expect people in different parts of the
organization to give me different estimates of critical parameters, and for there to be
fundamental differences in how people view and parametrize the system even
among people of similar job title and responsibility.
I would expect the model building exercise to generate substantial discussion
of what the key points of the system and the key parameters really are.
In addition, I would expect that in its role in exacting an understanding of the
most important aspects of the system and their interactions, the modeling tool can
be used as a language within the utility for visualizing and better discussing how
their maintenance organization operates.
Last, I would expect that those in charge of maintenance and of work process
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will find the modeling tool of use in evaluating policy alternatives for doing
maintenance.
Chapter II : Nuclear Power and Maintenance:
A Primer
Nuclear Power: An Introduction
Ever since the Manhattan Project unleashed the awesome power of the atom
to create the first atomic bomb, some have regretted leaving mankind with the
terrible, burdensome potential to annihilate the planet. Thinking that some good
must come out of the tremendous scientific and engineering breakthroughs that
enabled the atom to be used as a weapon of destruction, some felt that atomic power
should be harnessed for the good of humanity.
In the 1950s the U.S. government was anxious to find peaceful uses for atomic
energy, and had a particular interest in developing atomic power production. The
reason for this haste is not clear; it certainly was not an expected shortage of power
or increase in energy costs (7). The federal Energy Research and Development
Administration (ERDA) has conservatively estimated that as of 1978, the
government has invested $9 billion in.nuclear technologies. If the utilities had paid
these expenses, the cost of electricity generated by NPPs would have increased by
more than 50% (8). But perhaps the greatest subsidy given to nuclear power is the
Price-Anderson Act, which protects utilities from liability in the event of an accident
(9).
How Does Nuclear Power Actually Work?
Nuclear fission, which is the process that all commercial nuclear reactors in
the world currently use, operates by splitting a Uranium-235 atom into its
constituent parts, which releases the energy that we can harness to heat water into
steam, and turn a turbine to produce electricity.
Where does this energy come from? Interestingly, the weight of the
constituent parts of the U-235 atom is less than the weight of the whole atom before
it is split. From Einstein, we know that there is conservation of matter and energy.
Therefore, the matter that is lost in splitting the atom provides the energy that we
are able to harness.
Uranium 235 composes only .7% of the uranium naturally found. The other
99.3% is Uranium 238, which does not split when it is hit with a neutron. So, the
only isotope of Uranium which really does the work in a nuclear fission reaction is
Uranium 235.
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Chain Reactions
In order for an atomic reaction to initially start, there must be a source of
neutrons. This source provides for the initial splitting of the U-235 atoms.
However, in order to be a source of energy, the nuclear reaction must be self-
sustaining.
A chain reaction occurs when there are enough U-235 atoms in a certain area
to insure that the neutrons from those atoms which have been split are enough to
cause other U-235 atoms to split, and so on. If U-235 atoms can continually
decompose without any additional input of neutrons, then there is a chain reaction.
Whether a chain reaction happens depends on the density of U-235 atoms,
the number of U-235 atoms, and the probability that a neutron will cause a U-235
atom to split.
It turns out that .7% of U-235 is not enough in most types of reactors to
sustain the chain reaction necessary to continually produce an output of energy.
Therefore, the uranium must be enriched, which means that the concentration of
U-235 must be boosted above the .7% that occurs in nature. US commercial reactors
typically require that there be about 3% U-235 in their fuel mixture. Small research
reactors require a much higher percentage of enrichment, and atomic bombs require
greater enrichment still -- between 90% and 95% U-235.
The Necessity of Refueling
Nuclear reactors cannot run forever on one batch of fuel. Well before all of
the U-235 is split, the fuel can no longer provide a chain reaction and must be
replaced by fresh fuel.
Obviously, in order to refuel, the reactor must shut down. This period of
time is called a planned outage. NPPs generally take advantage of this period by
doing maintenance work which was deemed too risky or impossible to do while the
reactor was in operation.
In US utilities, planned outages generally last from 40 to 80 days, and occur
every year and a half. Utilities strive to make this time as short as possible, as these
outages are very expensive. The NPPs are not producing any power during this
time, which means that the utility must either generate power through other means
at a higher variable cost, or they must purchase power from other utilities, which
certainly will be expensive. They also must bring in many hundreds of outside
workers to help with the myriad tasks necessary during a planned outage. The
combination of having to supply replacement power, and to pay up hundreds of
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outside workers for the length of the outage make shortening outages very desirable
to utilities which are no longer assured a percentage of their cost as profit.
US utilities are generally shocked to hear that, for example, Finnish NPPs are
able to have planned outages in 12 to 15 days (10). This shows both the degree of
improvement possible in outage time, and the relative isolation of US NPPs in their
knowledge of NPPs in other countries.
Forced Outages
It should be noted that less frequently in the US, but often elsewhere, NPPs
are asked to reduce power when less power is needed. In the US, nuclear power are
run as the baseload, and other sources, such as fossil fuel plants, fill in the peaks of
power consumption.
However, even between outages, NPPs don't always produce electricity.
There are also forced outages. A forced outage is, by definition, unplanned. It occurs
when the reactor must shut down because of not meeting regulations laid down by
the NRC, or because of some unforeseen equipment malfunction that endangers the
safety of the plant or causes the operators or the computer to think that safety is
being endangered. US NPPs average about one forced outage per year.
Nuclear Safety
At a nuclear power plant, safety is generally defined in terms of the
probability of a core meltdown. A core meltdown occurs when the chain reaction is
allowed to progress too rapidly, heating the uranium fuel to such an extent that it
melts. If the uranium melts, there is a chance that the reactor vessel will be
breached, and a chance that massive amounts of radioactive particles will be spewed
into the atmosphere.
At Three Mile Island, some of the core did melt, causing such damage that the
reactor will never operate again. Fortunately, little radiation escaped into the
atmosphere. The world was not so lucky with Chernobyl.
What could cause a core melt? It could be that a critical safety system fails just
when it is needed. This would mean that there was a string of events necessitating
the use of the safety system. These events could be anything from the failure of
important non-safety equipment, to failure of a control system to respond to
operator commands, to the failure of indicators to show the actual status of the
plant, or simply to the operators' lack of understanding of the problem.
A nuclear plant is extremely complex, and the relationships between different
components of the plant are nonlinear. So many things are connected together,
operate in parallel, and depend on each other that it is often not clear how the
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failure of one component will affect the entire plant. It is not conjecture, but fact
borne out at Three Mile Island and in other instances, that things can be so complex
in an emergency that operators do not understand what is going wrong (11). This is
not the fault of the operators, who are only human, but the nature of having an
extremely complex system that must be corrected in minutes or even seconds if
something goes wrong.
It is clear, however, that the greater percentage of your equipment you have
operating without fault, the less chance there is for something strange to happen
that could cause an emergency.
What is Maintenance?
It seems perfectly obvious what maintenance is -- keeping the equipment
running. However, there are many ways to do this.
You can repair equipment when it breaks down, and concentrate on repairing
it as quickly and as efficiently as possible. This is Corrective Maintenance (CM).
Corrective Maintenance can also be called "reactive" maintenance, as the
maintenance organization is allowing problems to reach the point of crisis and then
fixing them, rather than doing anything about the underlying reasons the
equipment is breaking down. The maintenance organization simply "reacts" to
problems.
You can periodically take equipment "down," or out-of-service, in order to
examine it and discover whether it has some imperfection or defect that will likely
cause it to break down in the future. This is Preventive Maintenance (PM).
Preventive Maintenance is often termed "proactive" maintenance, as the
maintenance organization is "proactively" doing something about the reasons
equipment breaks down, rather than simply waiting for breakdowns to occur. An
example of Preventive Maintenance would be bringing your car in for a complete
checkup at regular intervals, or going to your doctor for a physical regularly even
though nothing is bothering you.
As opposed to Preventive Maintenance, which requires an invasive test,
there is another type of maintenance which is also proactive but uses less invasive
procedures. It is called Predictive Maintenance. This would involve, for example,
analyzing the oil in a pump for metallic content. If there is excessive metallic
content, this is a good indication that there is excessive wear in the pump, and that
it has a higher than average probability of breaking down.
Preventive Maintenance: A Closer Look
There are two drawbacks to preventive maintenance that maintenance
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personnel often point out: if done too frequently, preventive maintenance can
actually damage equipment, and it can be more expensive than letting the part
operate until failure and then replacing it.
Can Preventive Maintenance Harm?
For example, one component of critical importance in a nuclear power plant
is the backup diesel generator. Without it, an on-site loss of power at a nuclear
power plant would mean that control of the plant, and the reactor, is lost. In all
likelihood, a catastrophic accident would be imminent.
It makes sense that the diesel generator is one component that must be in a
preventive maintenance program.
However, doing preventive maintenance means starting and stopping the
generator, so that testing it actually wears it down and contributes to its failure. This
fact argues that it is important to find some happy medium between having
confidence the generator will work if and when it is called upon to work, and not
contributing to its failure by excessive testing.
Can Preventive Maintenance be Too Expensive?
When it is argued that preventive maintenance can be more expensive than
letting a part operate until failure, it must be made clear how "expense" and "cost"
are defined. Generally, people say that the billable hours of personnel doing
preventive maintenance can exceed the price of simply waiting for a breakdown and
replacing the part. What they usually mean is that the cost of keeping extra people
on the payroll to perform the preventive maintenance work can exceed the price of
simply doing nothing and buying a new part.
This view of "cost" is primarily in monetary terms. "Cost" can also be
defined as the cost of doing the PM work when you could have been doing some
other type of maintenance work (opportunity cost).
There is also a different type of cost: if the failure of the piece of equipment
could have ramifications for overall plant safety and the probability of a core
meltdown, waiting for it to fail means that you are less sure that the part will
operate if and when it is called upon to operate than if you regularly checked its
status and took steps to correct any small problem that could later turn into a larger
one.
Since nuclear power plants typically have multiple backup systems, if you are
uncertain about one system you can rely on another. However, this means that you
have effectively reduced the redundancy of the system. You are relying on fewer
pieces of equipment.
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Being less sure that the equipment will operate when needed puts a strain on
operators and introduces the possibility of them not understanding whether
something is wrong and whether they are acting to correct the problem if something
is indeed wrong. In other words, less confidence in the equipment introduces the
possibility of more confusion. When the stakes are as high as those involving the
possibility of a core melt, skimping on preventive maintenance to save cost can be
an expensive policy indeed.
Maintenance in the Context of Nuclear Power
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has an extensive set of
requirements that NPPs must meet in order to operate. These are intended to
ensure that the regulations list specific pieces of equipment that preventive
maintenance must be done on and the intervals in which it must be performed.
These pieces of equipment are generally related to the safety systems of the plant,
and their failure would contribute greatly to increasing the probability of a core
meltdown.
In many other industrial settings, such as fossil fuel power plants, a plant is
free to adopt an entirely CM-based maintenance program if it wishes. It has a wide
degree of choice as to the mix of CM and PM work, and can continue operating if it
is behind schedule in doing preventive maintenance on a piece of equipment.
NPPs do not have this luxury. Not performing PM work on a required piece
of equipment on its required date means that the NPP must shut down. If it does
not shut down, it would likely lose its license to operate.
Of course, NPPs can do more PM work than required, and they often do. On
these extra pieces of equipment, they would like to do better than selecting at
random the intervals in which to do PM work. Random selection means that, as
most of the equipment is working without fault most of the time (hopefully!), most
pieces of equipment will have nothing wrong with them, so the PM program may
damage equipment more than it catches defects.
Many plants therefore have Preventive Maintenance Optimization (PMO)
programs, which are used to choose efficient intervals for for PM work. PMO
programs examine the history of failure of each different type of equipment to try to
discover when equipment, on average, starts to fail. From this information, it is
possible to make a more educated guess as to the proper intervals to do preventive
maintenance on each different type of equipment.
Page 20
Chapter III : Modeling Methodology
An Introduction to System Dynamics
The model uses a methodology called System Dynamics, which was
pioneered at MIT by Professor Jay Forrester and derived from control systems
engineering. After doing groundbreaking work on servomechanisms during World
War II, Prof. Forrester hypothesized that viewing social systems as complex analogs
of mechanical systems may be useful for understanding them better. He argued that
the same processes of control through information feedback, and of flow and
accumulation of material or information, occurs in social as well as in mechanical
systems.
In mathematical terms, System Dynamics is a way to represent a system
through differential equations. There are rates of flow, which may be governed by
various rules, and there are stocks, which accumulate material or information. The
situation is analogous to the differential equation problem of finding the level of
liquid in a tank through knowing the rate of inflow and the rate of outflow.
Rate of Inflow
Tank
Rate of Outflow
Here, the double-lined arrows represent pipes, and the circles attached to
them represent valves. The arrow going into the tank represents an inflow, and
arrow coming from the tank represents an outflow. Just as with a real tank, the
contents of the tank are determined by the initial level and by the difference
between the rate of inflow and the rate of outflow.
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Applying the same concepts to national budgeting and finance, a seemingly
very different type of system, the budget deficit is the inflow, and the liquid in the
tank is the debt.
Yearly Budget Surplus
We see that entirely eliminating the budget deficit within seven years, as is
now proposed, would halt the inflow into the container, but would do nothing to
reduce the level of that container (the debt). To reduce the level, we would need a
budget surplus (12).
Just as putting the budget deficit and the debt in the language of stocks and
flows helps clarify their relationship, putting other social systems in these terms can
help elucidate their true relationship. We see the first benefit of the methodology,
before even turning on a computer or solving a mathematical equation: by
requiring that the key elements of a system be understood and put in the proper
relationship with each other, people are forced to think about how the individual
parts fit together to form the entire system. Clearly, having an overall picture of the
system is key to understanding it and suggesting policy improvements. However,
in a society where we have become increasingly specialized, having this kind of
holistic view is not common.
Even after diagramming the system and striving to capture what is most
important, what we are left with can still be quite complicated. It is often not clear
how systems with many stocks, flows, and feedbacks behave, which is the reason
people often cannot agree on whether a particular governmental policy will be
beneficial or detrimental, and the reason why accidents like Three Mile Island occur.
It seems, then, that if it is difficult for most of us to envision how a multitude
of stocks and flows act together to produce the behavior of a system, that it would be
useful to have some way of being able to simulate how a system evolves over time.
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System Dynamics goes beyond diagramming to offer such a method of
simulation. By outlining the structure of the system you're interested in, and by
capturing the decision rules which govern how equipment, workers, resources, etc.
"flow" through the system, it becomes possible to represent the system as a
collection of differential equations. By numerically simulating these differential
equations simultaneously, one can see how the system evolves over time. It is then
possible to change decision rules and parameters in the model to gain insight into
the system.
In short, System Dynamics provides a framework for understanding systems
composed of parts or elements that influence each other over time. Even though
the elements of the system may be well-known, the interconnections between the
elements produce behavior too complex for people to fully understand without
special learning tools. System Dynamics provides just such a tool.
Popular commercial packages allowing modeling with System Dynamics
include "Vensim" of Ventana Systems, Inc., and "ithink" by High Performance
Systems, Inc. They are both available for either Macintosh or IBM compatible
personal computers.
A few examples of where Systemii Dynamics has been used successfully in the
past in related domains:
1) EPRI built an industry-level financial model used to understand electricity
prices, demand, etc.
2) Prof. Kent Hansen at MIT has built a model of the impact of social and
political factors on nuclear power plants, including model "sectors" of plant
operations, safety, financial resources, and government;
3) Palo Verde built a model of a spent fuel pool loss of level scenario; and
4) DuPont built a model of maintenance, featuring corrective and preventive
maintenance, allowing for investments in spare part quality, raw materials, etc. The
model was turned into a board game simulation that thousands of employees have
played in workshops.
System Dynamics models work best with systems whose elements are known,
yet the interactions between the elements produce complex behavior that evolves
over time.
Page 23
What Can the Model Do?
This model is not meant for specific projections. It is not a linear
programming or optimization model, whose purpose is to tell you how many
people should do planning, scheduling, or maintenance, or to give the optimum
number of preventive vs. corrective jobs.
Although it cannot provide point predictions, it can show relationships and
trends. And the trends are not simple extrapolations of what has been in the past,
but trends which emerge from how the different parts of the system interrelate and
evolve through time.
The model offers a way for people to visualize how the maintenance system
in its entirety works. People can increase their understanding of maintenance and
its effects on the plant extremely rapidly by being able to see the entire system at
once, and by being able to change policies and parameters and see what happens to
the system. "What if" experiments that would be expensive or time-consuming in
an actual plant can be experienced in minutes or hours.
The model also makes an excellent tool for discussion. Because the system is
made explicit, people cannot "talk past each other" -- all of the differences in the way
people conceive of maintenance are no longer left to allow misunderstandings and
lack of clarity in conversation, but are explicitly brought out. And once people agree
on the system they are talking about and the assumptions that go into it, it becomes
possible to evaluate maintenance policies in a much more concrete and decisive
manner.
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Chapter IV: Responses to project methods
What reactions were there at each stage of the project, and what impact did these
have?
Although Tyler Power is an innovative organization, this was the first time
they were exposed to a project whose goal was to model a part of their organization.
They were also not used to the System Dynamics methodology, and thought of
models more in terms of optimization and static linear programming.
Skeptical of the project but hoping that it could lead to some important
insights, both a Tyler Headquarters group and a group of Work Process Control
managers meeting at Tyler One were willing to give us some of their time.
First Meeting - Introduction
Our first meeting was designed to introduce the idea of doing a model and
gaining support for the modeling effort within Tyler, to obtain a thorough
understanding of the SRT concept, and to get some idea for what the goal of the
modeling effort should be.
At this meeting Prof. Carroll and I introduced the System Dynamics
methodology, and showed what a model looked like on a personal computer.
The group of engineers and technicians seemed to feel comfortable with the
way system dynamics is able to explain the behavior of a systems. Moreover, we
collected a great deal of data about how work orders flow through both the regular
maintenance process and through SRT.
Upon reflecting on the meeting, it became clear that we did not get a better
idea for what the aim of the modeling effort should be. Professor Carroll and I had
spoken about creating a model to compare the operation of the plant with and
without the SRT organization, and of being able to see how maintenance policies
affect the safety of the plant. The Tyler Headquarters group didn't really seem to be
interested in either of these things.
Second Meeting - Taking a Step Back
For our second meeting, I felt strongly that we needed to step back and get a
better idea of what they would like to see modeled. Was there any problem with the
new organization they were having? Was anything happening that they didn't
understand and would like to understand?
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Prof. Carroll and I started with asking them the motivations that prompted
them to conceive of and implement the SRT team, hoping that this would start
discussion and lead to what the group saw as most important for the modeling
effort. Interestingly, it took the group roughly half an hour before they were
reasonably satisfied that they had mentioned the reasons SRT had been
implemented. It seems fair to say that they had not thought about why they were
implementing SRT for quite some time -- their focus was on getting it
implemented.
After asking them about the reasons for implementing SRT, I led them in an
elicitation session designed to help them map out the critical components of
maintenance, and how maintenance, profits, outages -- in short, to those things
they considered important components of their system -- relate together. The
methodology I used is known among system dynamicists as "causal loop
diagramming." It is not designed to differentiate between stocks and flows, but
merely to get an idea for what are the important components and dynamics that
determine system behavior.
I had done a similar exercise with Mr. Juha Pernu, visiting scholar at MIT and
maintenance manager at a Finnish NPP. I brought the causal loop diagram that I
had elicited from him and showed the group; they were extremely interested in how
he viewed what influences the length of outages and how he viewed the system in
general. It seemed that the causal loop map offered an effective way to present the
"mental model" of another person -- I felt that in explaining the map of Mr. Pernu, I
was speaking much more explicitly and precisely than I would have were I just to
have made an outline of his comments. In fact, I don't believe that I could have
elicited so much information from him were I not to use the technique of causal
loop diagramming. The technique forces you to be clear about how things
interconnect, and does not allow the ambiguity that is part of normal conversation
about a subject.
In this second meeting, Prof. Carroll and I also showed them a diagram of
how maintenance was conceived of in the DuPont model. This diagram was not a
causal loop diagram, but a diagram which showed the flows from one stock to
another, and what governed those flows. This type of diagram is closer to how an
actual model looks, and is often called a policy diagram.
Perhaps surprisingly, the maintenance manager from Tyler Two present at
the meeting said that as an engineer, the stock-and-flow diagram was much more
intuitive to him than the causal-loop diagram. It was clear that there was some
storage, some backlog, and some flow, whereas the causal loop diagram doesn't
make clear whether you are talking about a flow of material or of information, and
the mechanics of how different parts affect each other isn't evident. However, it
seems like part of this difference is endemic: concepts that seem inherently more
"fuzzy" must be expressed with causal-loop diagrams, as the amount of thought
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necessary to turn them into an operational model (which is the direction a stock-
and-flow diagram is proceeding in) has not been done, and therefore it is simply not
possible to show precisely how the different parts affect each other because it is not
understood; and the fact that something can be expressed in a stock-and-flow form
means necessarily that the various concepts have already been thought out and
simplified to the degree that the relationships are quite clear, so that they are easier
to understand should come as no surprise.
After eliciting a causal loop diagram from them of their system, and after
showing them the diagrams from Mr. Pernu and from the DuPont model, Prof.
Carroll and I returned to MIT, and I was left with the task of going over the elicited
diagram to figure out what that meant for the model building effort.
Third Meeting -- NPP Visit and Model Demonstration
I spent roughly a shift with the SRT team at Tyler One NPP, talking with the
SRT manager, the shift supervisor, SRT team members, and others about how work
orders were executed and how the way maintenance is done has changed since the
introduction of SRT. Following the day at Tyler One, I went to Tyler Headquarters
where I held the third meeting there since the inception of the modeling project.
For the first time the kind of information a System Dynamics model can give
was understood. And also feared.
Upon learning about the practices of other modelers showing their embryonic
models in order to get feedback on which relations made sense and which did not, I
had decided to take a risk and show them what I had done. I hoped that any loss of
their confidence in the model, which was almost inevitable given the inaccuracies
inherent in the early stages of a modeling project, would be more than made up for
by valuable information in developing the model.
On showing the model to the shift manager at Tyler One, he asked me if I
were a professor at MIT. I gather that the way the equipment flow in the model was
put together made sense to him, and it seemed like it incorporated some true
relations which were not evident to the casual observer.
On showing the model as it stood to the group gathered in Tyler
Headquarters, I got the impression that two of them were impressed that here was a
model which, on the surface, seemed to represent the changes they had made in the
work process in a form which could be simulated. The flow of equipment made
sense to them. However, on asking about whether the flow of defects made sense,
there was only silence. Finally the maintenance manager from Tyler Two admitted
that it didn't make sense to him, that it seemed far too abstract. The others' silence
led me to believe that they had similar sentiments.
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I was a bit dismayed, after having explained to the the idea at the last meeting
(a month before) about how the DuPont model represented maintenance as a defect
flow. Nevertheless, I attempted to explain it again and defend the backbone of the
model.
The maintenance manager of Tyler Two asked what the purpose of the model
was, what information it was supposed to show. I replied that it would hopefully
help in setting maintenance policy, making it possible to test different policies
without actually having to implement them. In an effort to show what I mean, I
ran the model a couple of different times, choosing the level of CM and PM done as
the policy option. The model run showed that the amount of operational
equipment available doing more PM was higher than the amount available doing
more CM. The maintenance manager reacted violently to this result, sarcastically
commenting that "I don't need a model to tell me that."
There especially seemed to be great interest in the Profits sector, and interest
in seeing whether the model showed a large maintenance team or a small one
generated the greatest overall profits. I felt that there probably was a tradeoff --
perhaps a larger team could keep equipment in better shape, decreasing outage
length and decreasing the incidence of unplanned outages in addition to providing
more manpower during outage for work, but that it would also cost more money to
employ the people. Unfortunately, the model did not incorporate unplanned
outages, and the length of the outage was then fixed, bearing no relation to the
actual number of defects present in the equipment. These two factors guaranteed
that the larger maintenance teams would appear as the most expensive option in
the model.
I did not mention these two factors at the time, perhaps because I had not
thought carefully about them. I simply said that they model was in an early stage of
development.
It is interesting to note the interest of the team leader in being able to get a
precise number of how large the maintenance force should be, and his opinion that
this could be very useful to the management of Tyler. It is equally interesting to not
the negative reaction of the Tyler Two maintenance manager, fearful that the model
will make a recommendation to cut staff (which, as a maintenance manager, are his
staff), and that in the current climate of cost cutting, this recommendation,
regardless of its wisdom, will fall on receptive ears and that the model will be used
as justification for drastic action.
Asking how maintenance staff size is decided now, the Tyler Two manager
revealed that it is determined by just decreasing the staff size by one, waiting a bit for
an unfavorable result, and repeating the process if nothing bad happens. I got the
impression that he didn't believe that this was the proper way to size the
maintenance force, but that he knew of no other way to do it. And he also
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mentioned that he thinks that it may not be that cutting the maintenance force is
the answer to increased savings, but that holding it constant or even increasing it
may be the safest and cheapest course in the long run.
Fourth Meeting - Getting Reconnected
After both having been away for the Summer, Prof. Carroll and I felt that we
had begun to lose contact with those we had been dealing with at Tyler. Perhaps
more importantly, the group we had been presenting to and running elicitation
sessions with was being disbanded, as the management of Tyler felt that they had
accomplished their goal of implementing SRT.
We felt that we needed to find out who within Tyler might act as our
"sponsors," not in a monetary sense but in giving of their time and being interested
in the project. Therefore, we felt we needed to have a meeting with the goal of
reconnecting with those at Tyler and to work on doing more than model building..
As to who would be present at this meeting, we wanted as large an audience as
possible, but specifically wanted to include the head of Work Process Control, who is
in charge of the Work Process Control managers at each of the three sites.
Specifically, in this meeting we wanted to discuss:
A) How can we use the modeling exercise to enhance productive
conversations and thinking?
B) How can we involve people in making use of the model building exercise
as an opportunity?
C) How can the process of our building a model together be studied?
As we were addressing some, such as the head of Work Process Control
(WPC), who had not previously been at the meetings, Prof. Carroll gave a short
introduction to the MIT Nuclear Safety Program, recalled the maintenance model
project goals (which were a combination of what we had elicited from the group in
the first two meetings, and what Prof. Carroll and I were interested in studying), and
gave a short explanation of what System Dynamics is. I then demonstrated the
model to the group, and did several policy runs for them.
There was a great deal of interest in the model and its potential for offering
insight into setting maintenance policy. The head of WPC, short on time, asked two
of his men to evaluate the "logic loops" of the model, in order to give him an idea
of how trustworthy it was.
We quickly made a second presentation to these two, and they made a few
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suggestions as to how productivity could be better represented. They seemed to be
favorably impressed with the effort and the model. The person chiefly responsible
for organizing the Tyler Headquarters meeting, after hearing the model presented
twice, commented to me, "I would have never believed that someone outside of the
[nuclear] industry could have gained so much detailed knowledge about it." He
asked that I work on a document that could be circulated to others not present at the
session in order to explain the modeling effort to them; in this way, he felt, we could
further support for the project within Tyler.
Prof. Carroll and I left feeling that we had accomplished our objective: we had
been able to convince others that the process of modeling and the model itself were
worthwhile, and we had found a new set of people to serve as our contacts within
Tyler.
Fifth Meeting -- Work Process Control Supervisors
After having written a 25-page document which described the methodology
and the model, I sent it to our contact who had organized the previous meeting to
distribute. After hearing no word for him for two weeks, Prof. Carroll and I called,
and got a very different impression from the one he gave us at the end of our last
meeting.
He said that he didn't perceive much interest on behalf of those at Tyler in
the model. One of the main reasons, he said, is that it didn't seem to address
problems they have and decisions they must make on a daily basis. In short, it
seemed that the benefits, brought by the use of the model and the conversation
engendered through constructing the model, were too nebulous and perhaps too
long-range to be of interest.
At this point, Prof. Carroll and I knew that if we did not make another effort
to connect with others in Tyler, our modeling effort and project would have to
continue in a vacuum. Since the contact with those at the utility was essential to
gathering the data to construct a model, and since observing the changes the model-
building effort made in those participating was an essential part of the project, and
since observing how the model was used by those in the organization after the
project ends would be quite interesting, we felt that not having further contact with
Tyler would be regrettable.
It was suggested that we get in touch with the other Work Process Control
managers at the sites. As I had been speaking with the Tyler One NPP Work Process
Control manager ever since my visit there, this seemed logical and natural to me.
The Tyler One Work Process control manager mentioned that the Work
Process Control managers from all the sites would be meeting several times in
November (1995), and invited me to come and present the model at one of those
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meetings. I did so. One of the participants commented "Those of us in this room
[the WPC managers] know more about the work process than anyone else in the
organization." Given the quantity and quality of the input I got at this meeting, I
felt that his statement was probably accurate.
Not only did I get some useful data for the model, I came away from the
meeting with the feeling that I had finally located the right group to "sponsor" the
project within Tyler. These men have been dealing with the same issues I have
been dealing with in the model and more, and for a much longer period of time.
They were open to and indeed attracted to a new methodology that could perhaps
shed light on problems they were well familiar with. They liked the fact that the
model allows you to see the evolution of the system over time graphically.
At this meeting, one of the strongest motives for constructing a model of
maintenance (in the viewpoint of those at Tyler) came up: the model might help
save SRT.
It turns out that the concept of SRT has come under increasing fire from
within Tyler. Some maintenance managers would like to see that the experiment
in changing how maintenance is done end. They would like their workers back.
They hold that SRT has not been as great as the management, the Work Control
Quality Improvement Process (WCQIP) team, and others have claimed.
The Work Process Control managers from the three sites unanimously agree
that the SRT concept has done wonders for the NPPs, and are deeply opposed to any
efforts to do away with it. To them, the contributions made by SRT are clear and
unambiguous. Asked how then some could oppose SRT, they offered that perhaps
the benefits may not be as clear to those not as intimately involved.
Again, as in the case of maintenance in general, the issues and dynamics are
sufficiently complex that it seems almost impossible to convey the years of
experience that often underlie judgments on policy.
The managers hoped that the model might offer a way of being able to
demonstrate the utility of SRT and concisely explain it to others not so intimately
familiar with the process. They were also interested in the other types of policy
analysis possible, notably the possibility of getting some type of estimate on the
number of workers necessary to meet backlog reduction targets.
It was clear that the group of managers valued the new possibilities the model
presented them with; they in fact suggested that we meet again. As they were
experts with the kind of data that I needed, and knew how to take the data and
frame it in terms useful to the model, they suggested that in our next meeting I
bring up all the parameters and estimates that I was unsure about and that they
would give it their best to come up with something.
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Sixth Meeting -- Final Input
In our sixth meeting, held again at Tyler One NPP, I aimed to do just that.
Not only were the Work Process Control managers present; one of the two Tyler
One maintenance mangers was present, along with a couple of others from
maintenance at Tyler One. Moreover, the head of WCQIP from Tyler Headquarters
was present.
In addition to serving to clarify some of the parameters in the model and
validate some minor structural changes, the use of the model as a tool for more
precise discussion was once again validated. The Tyler One maintenance manager
was outspoken in this meeting and had interesting comments throughout. In
explaining SRT, he admitted that he had not fully decided whether SRT was most
effective in doing bigger and more complicated jobs, or in doing lots of smaller jobs.
By the end of the meeting, he began to feel that it was in the latter category that SRT
was perhaps the most useful. The Tyler Headquarters representative hailed this as
"a major breakthrough," only saying this after the maintenance manager left the
room.
The Tyler Headquarters representative and the Work Process Control
managers, through long experience with SRT, had developed the conviction that to
be effective, it should not do the same nature of tasks as the regular maintenance
organization: it should concentrate on volume. Through a concentration on
volume, SRT is able to keep both work orders and work requests out of the regular
maintenance system. This means reducing the work load of planners, schedulers,
and maintenance workers, allowing them to concentrate on fewer, more important
and difficult tasks; and lessening the time that a nonsensical request clogs the system
and slows valid requests in being processed. It means that something that could be
repaired fairly quickly is not caught in a scheduling bottleneck, waiting until more
complicated and lengthy tasks are accomplished. By doing this, SRT would be doing
its best to keep problems from cropping up to disrupt the maintenance schedule.
I left Tyler One that day with revised estimates on the number of
maintenance workers and their productivity, the suggestion that it would be nice for
the model to calculate the minimum amount of workers necessary to accomplish
goals set for them, as well as the suggestion that the model should allow users to
make changes in the parameters without having to know where the parameters are
in the model itself.
For a detailed account of a meeting with the Work Process Control managers,
in many ways typical of the types of exchanges working on the model elicits, see
Appendix C.
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Chapter V: Simulating Maintenance -- The
Structure of the Model
How Is Maintenance Simulated?
Maintenance can be thought of as a defect pump. A defect is an imperfection
in a piece of equipment, which can show up as excessive motor vibration, slow
valve closing times, etc. In other words, defective equipment is degraded but still
capable of meeting operational specifications. Unless preventive action is taken, a
defect will cause a breakdown of that piece of equipment later in time.
Corrective Maintenance (CM) is essentially the "pumping" of defects out of
pieces of equipment that have already broken down. Preventive Maintenance (PM)
ideally works to discover and fix defective pieces of equipment before they break
down. Preventive Maintenance Optimization (PMO) focuses on predicting when a
piece of equipment will be operating with a defect, and to focus PM on those
defective pieces. The better the PMO program, the fewer perfectly operating (defect-
free) pieces of equipment will be taken out of service for PM work and the more
defective but operating equipment will be worked on.
But maintenance is not perfect. "Not all of the defects in equipment which has
broken down will be discovered by maintenance, and defects can actually be
introduced (a pump seal improperly repacked, etc.). We expect PM work to be of
higher quality (more defects discovered, fewer introduced) than CM work because
some of the same pieces of equipment are worked on at regular intervals and thus
workers are more experienced with them, plans of how to conduct the PM are
quickly and readily available, and generally there is more time to prepare for PM
work and less pressure to complete work quickly.
We also see that this approximation of maintenance allows for there to be
such a thing as too much preventive work. When perfectly operating pieces of
equipment are taken down for corrective maintenance, by definition no defects can
be taken out of them. But through improper reassembly, excessive testing, etc.,
defects can be introduced.
How Is The Model Structured?
There are eight subsets or "stocks" of equipment in different states of
operation and repair. A piece of equipment is in just one of these eight states at any
point in time. An example of a "stock" is broken down equipment; if it is broken
down, then it is not perfectly operating and it is not operating with a defect. The
inflow to the stock depends on the rate at which equipment is breaking down. The
outflow depends on the rate at which the equipment is discovered to be broken
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down, at which point it enters into another stock -- equipment which has broken
down and is waiting repair by SRT or the regular maintenance organization. A
stock therefore is something which represents storage and allows for accumulation
and depletion, similar to the level of water in a bathtub.
Below is the outline of the main part of the model, the equipment sector.
Boxes represent stocks, double lines represent pipes that carry the flows from one
stock to another, and circles attached to the double lines represent the valves which
control the rate of flow through the pipes between the stocks.
Maintenance repair
for PM
disc def op equip bkdwn PM disc def sched rate
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Pieces of equipment flow from the Perfectly Operating Equipment (Stock 1) to
Defective Operating Equipment (Stock 2) based on the rate at which pieces of
equipment gain defects. The Defective Operating Equipment discovery rate
determines the rate at which pieces of equipment flow from Defective Operating
Equipment to Discovered Defective Operating Equipment (Stock 3). Moreover,
Defective Operating Equipment becomes Broken Down Equipment (Stock 4) over
time. Discovered Defective Operating Equipment also becomes Broken Down
Equipment over time if no action is taken on it.
Broken Down Equipment becomes Discovered Broken Down Equipment
(Stock 5) at a rate called the discovery rate, which depends mainly on the number of
PMs that are done. Once a piece of broken down equipment is discovered, the
maintenance organization is immediately notified of it. The piece of equipment is
"sent" to one of the two maintenance repair organizations: the standard
maintenance organization, where there is planning and scheduling and then finally
repair, or the SRT (single-point-of-contact) team. Equipment thus flows from
Discovered Broken Down Equipment to Maintenance Repair (Stock 6) and SRT
Repair (Stock 7). The percentage of equipment flowing to Maintenance Repair and
to SRT Repair depends on the difficulty of the jobs, the skill level of the SRT team,
and the amount of additional work thi SRT team can take. At Tyler, approximately
43% of work orders flow to SRT. Stock 8 is the equipment taken down for
preventive maintenance, which comes from both mandatory and elective
preventive work.
The amount of equipment in the Maintenance Repair (Stock 6) and SRT
Repair (Stock 7) are the maintenance backlog and SRT backlog, respectively. From
Maintenance Repair and SRT Repair, equipment flows back to either Perfect
Operating Equipment (Stock 1) or Defective Operating Equipment (Stock 2) upon
completion of repair work. The percentage going to Stock 1 and to Stock 2 depends
on the quality of the maintenance work. The higher the quality, the more
equipment returns to perfect operating condition and the fewer is returned to
operation with a defect.
Actual View of the Equipment Sector and Model Equations
Appendix A gives a view of the equipment sector, as used in the simulation
runs, in all its complexity. The circles are called converters, and represent either a
fixed quantity or perform some calculation. They do not directly determine the
flows between the stocks, but can provide information and decision rules which
serve to govern the flows. In contrast to pipes, which represent flows of actual
pieces of equipment, arrows are informational links. Appendix B gives the full
equations for the model.
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Priority for Work
The flow of equipment from stock to stock depends in large part upon
decisions made about work priority. As only a finite amount of jobs can be
accomplished, determining which get done first is critical.
Presented below is the priority for the base-case scenario, which is the scenario
which most closely mimics the actual priorities as I understand them from
conversations with Tyler Power personnel. Priorities can and will be changed in
later model runs to see what effects these changes have on the system.
Regular Maintenance Team
The first priority for work is Mandatory Preventive Maintenance, also known
as programmed maintenance. This is required by regulation, and if not performed
the plant must be shut down.
The second priority for work is CM work, whose goal is to keep the plant
operating and backlog from climbing above a certain level. Under the base-case
scenario, no matter how much one would like to take workers from programmed
maintenance to work down the CM backlog, it simply is not possible.
Third in priority is proactive work on Discovered Defective Operating
Equipment. Lowest priority is proactive work on equipment which may or may not
have defects. A good PMO (preventive maintenance optimization) program helps
insure that a greater percentage of defective operating equipment is worked on
under this lowest priority work.
SRT team
The first priority for the SRT team is to make sure that the SRT Repair
backlog (CM work) does not climb above a certain level. The second priority is to
assist the regular maintenance team with work on Discovered Defective Operating
Equipment (PM work). The last priority SRT work is to assist the regular
maintenance team with PM work on equipment whose status is not known.
Other Sectors in the Model
Equipment, while it contains the bulk of the operation of the model, is not
the only sector in the model. There is the Financial Sector, which looks at the
revenues and expenditures of the plant and thus is able to let one look at plant
profitability. There is an Outage Sector, which both governs when the planned
outages takes place and computes the probability for a forced outage depending on
the state of equipment in the plant. Of course, whether the plant is in outage or not
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greatly affects the Finance Sector, as a plant in outage is clearly not bringing in
revenues and is expending even more than usual on the increased number of
workers an outage requires.
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Chapter VI : Modeling Methodology
How Was the Structure of the Model Obtained?
Model Development
We made four visits to Tyler Headquarters, meeting with the WCQIP as well
as maintenance managers and those from Tyler's business unit, visited Tyler One
and spent a shift with SRT, had two working session with the Work Process Control
managers from the three plants in which we critically studied the model in detail,
and conducted numerous phone interviews and informal conversations.
It is important to note that the data in the initial conditions of the model
represent Tyler One Nuclear Power Plant. We felt that it would ease data collection
and improve internal consistency by modeling one plant. In the future, data for
other plants can be entered in.
Goal of the Meetings
The goal of the meetings evolved as the project progressed.
Initially, the focus of the meetings was on determining exactly what should be
modeled. What kinds of things were troubling or poorly understood within Tyler?
In what areas would insight be most welcome? Answering these types of questions
gives some idea of the kinds of things which need to be in the model, and what the
boundary of the model should be.
To help answer these questions, group elicitation sessions were held at
headquarters in Tyler Headquarters, where people from maintenance managers to
corporate finance experts were present. We asked them what they felt was most
important to know.
Upon determining what should be modeled, the next step was figuring out
how to model it. I relied on essentially two sources: those at Tyler Power, and a
maintenance model which had already been developed by a group at DuPont.
Holding more elicitation sessions in Tyler Headquarters, the goal this time
was to discover what elements were most important in the system that we wished
to analyze. We also wanted to get a basic idea of how the elements interrelated.
These sessions served to form the basic structure of the model.
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After outlining the structure, it was necessary to obtain real data in order to
make the initial parameters realistic. Speaking with Work Process Control manager
of Tyler One, I got estimates on the number of CM and PM jobs done each week at
Tyler One. Speaking with others, I obtained the total amount of equipment in the
plant. From this information, and information on the productivity of workers in
SRT and in Maintenance, I was able to derive the initial conditions of the model.
Finally, the two meetings held with the Work Process Control supervisors
from all three sites served as a proving ground for the model. The participants
knew more than anyone else in the organization about SRT and about the work
process. I asked them to criticize every aspect of the model, from its structure to the
initial conditions and assumptions to the output.
Initial Conditions of the Model
The initial conditions of this model do matter in determining the both the
specifics and the general trend of the output. I freely admit that there are many
inadequacies in the initial conditions used. Different people within Tyler give me
different estimates of parameters that are very important and sensitive for the
system's behavior. Some types of data are simply not being gathered, and I had to
make an educated guess as to what they should be.
Although inadequacies in the initial conditions make pinpoint, precise
predictions an exercise in futility, as shall be discussed later they still enable the
model to be useful as a tool for understanding and talking about the system in a
more precise and meaningful way.
Initialization Methodology -- Essential Data
The data used for the initial conditions of the plant come directly from Tyler
One. Those experienced with the equipment database at Tyler One told us that there
are 107,000 pieces of equipment in the entire plant, according to their definitions.
That is the total number of pieces of equipment in the model. Data from Tyler One
tell us that maintenance does about 300 jobs a week on average, which is scheduled
work and therefore includes both corrective and preventive work. Therefore, the
model was set up initially to do about 300 jobs per week.
This 300 jobs per week was used to set the programmed maintenance at 150
jobs per week, and all other types of maintenance at 150 jobs per week. If there is a
flow of 150 corrective jobs per week, handled by both SRT and by the maintenance
organization, this means that in steady-state condition, 150 pieces of equipment
must be becoming defective per week, 150 pieces of defective equipment must be
breaking down per week, 150 pieces of broken-down equipment must be becoming
discovered and showing up on the SRT log per week, and finally that 150 pieces of
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equipment, from both SRT and the maintenance organization, must be returned to
service per week.
I have attempted to initialize the model at just such a steady-state condition.
Estimating Unknown Parameters
In addition, the numbers of pieces of equipment initially defective and
undiscovered, broken down and undiscovered, etc. are inherently unknown, but an
effort to roughly quantify them was made by using the fact that the flows are about
150 per week. For example, we assume that a piece of equipment, once it becomes
defective, breaks down in 14 weeks. This means that if we are to have 150 pieces of
equipment breaking down in the first week, we must initially have 2100 ( which is
150 * 14) pieces of defective equipment. Since defective equipment is in two
categories, discovered and undiscovered, the 2100 pieces of defective equipment
must be divided between the two.
Where did the 14 week statistic on average time to breakdown of defective
equipment come from? The DuPont maintenance model has defective equipment
breaking down in 12 weeks, and is based on a careful statistical study of many
different types of equipment found in a chemical manufacturing plant. Prof. Kent
Hansen's research group at MIT has held that 14 weeks is appropriate for a nuclear
plant, as a nuclear plant typically has equipment made to a higher standard than is
found in other industries.
However, in the case of defective undiscovered equipment, there is
programmed maintenance being done on a certain percentage of this equipment; if
we assume that the programmed maintenance predicts correctly 50% of the time
that a piece of equipment has a defect, and the other 50% of the time programmed
work is done on perfectly operating equipment, with 150 pieces of equipment
worked on a week (initially) by programmed maintenance, then 75 pieces of
defective equipment per week are being worked on under programmed
maintenance. This means that our defect rate will have to insure that roughly 225
pieces of perfectly operating equipment become defective during the second week of
the simulation.
There is an additional complication, however. The 150 parts that are
breaking down per week are split between the defective parts you know about and
those you don't. So, those 2100 pieces of defective operating equipment are split
between those two categories. We see now that we must also have an idea of the
initial work per week done on discovered defective equipment.
How do we calculate how much work per week is initially done on the
discovered defective equipment? As it is lowest in priority, we must calculate
everything ahead of it in priority. We know that in the beginning, if we are satisfied
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with the current maintenance backlog, we will be doing corrective 150 work orders
per week, split between SRT and the regular maintenance organization. If we
assume that SRT will take roughly 50% of these work orders, SRT will be doing 75
work orders a week and the regular maintenance organization will be doing the
same amount. As we know that maintenance is doing 150 programmed
maintenance jobs a week, and that it can do a total of 240 jobs a week, this means
that after the programmed maintenance and the CM work, 240-150-75 = 15 jobs per
week are initially done on discovered defective operating equipment by the regular
maintenance organization. SRT also contributes to working on the discovered
defective operating equipment. As we assume 14 shifts of 6 men each, and that each
two man team can accomplish 2 jobs per shift, SRT has a total capacity of 84 jobs a
week. As 91-75=16, SRT does 16 jobs per week on discovered defective operating
equipment initially.
It should be noted that those at headquarters told us that a two-person SRT
team was able to accomplish a little more than one job per shift, while the Work
Process Control Managers told me that the number is closer to four. This is a drastic
difference, which we shall explore the implications of shortly.
Therefore, maintenance and SRT together are completing about 31 jobs per
week on discovered defective operating equipment.
But we still haven't figured out how the 2100 pieces of defective equipment
should be split between discovered and undiscovered. Those at Tyler have
absolutely no idea. Moreover, they didn't even want to hazard a guess as to the rate
at which undiscovered defective equipment becomes discovered. They did mention
that this rate would increase as the rate of preventive maintenance increases, as
does the rate of discovery of broken down equipment.
Clearly, the rate of discovering defective equipment must depend on the
amount of defective equipment not yet discovered. We can say therefore, with a
fairly high degree of confidence, that the rate is in the form of a percentage of
undiscovered defective operating equipment. What is this percentage? Here I can
only make a rough guess. It can't be too high, or all of the equipment would become
discovered immediately. It must be a fairly low number -- 5% is my guess. So, 5% of
the undiscovered defective operating equipment per week becomes discovered.
Those I spoke with in Tyler in general felt that this number would depend on
the amount of work being done in the plant: the more preventive maintenance, the
more corrective work, the more operations personnel making rounds noticing the
status of equipment, the greater the percent of undiscovered defective equipment
becoming discovered per week. However, as the 5% estimate is rough, we have
little idea what the upper and lower bounds would be based on the amount of
activity in the plant, for the sake of simplicity we will use a fixed estimate for now.
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Defect Rate
We now consider the defect rate, which describes the rate at which perfectly
operating equipment becomes defective. Unfortunately, none of those I've spoken
with at Tyler power can even begin to guess at what this might be. This in itself is
interesting, because the defect rate appears (just from looking at the diagram of the
system) to be an extremely important parameter. Everyone I've talked to agrees that
a defective (but operating) pieces of equipment puts stress on other pieces
equipment connected with it; and they agree that equipment can be thought of as
having a maximum life span -- so that even if there were no defective parts around
it, it could not be expected to operate forever. Therefore, it seems clear that the
defect rate should have these two components: it is determined both by the total
number of defective operating parts, and by some natural life span.
It also seems clear that in the beginning, the defect rate should be equal to the
number of parts becoming once again Perfect Operating Equipment after having
been worked on by the maintenance crews or SRT. However, it is not at all clear
what portion of this number should come from being influenced by the pieces of
defective operating equipment, and what portion should come from natural aging
of parts.
I have therefore estimated this number through sensitivity testing in the
model. If we say that 10 pieces of defective operating equipment cause 1 piece of
perfectly operating equipment to become defective each week, the plant conditions
quickly deteriorate beyond control. If we say that 100 pieces of defective operating
equipment cause 1 piece of perfectly operating equipment to become defective each
week, then the defective equipment has very little impact on the plant. We have
some bounds.on the number, then -- it must be between 1% and 10% per week. A
rough guess would be about halfway between those numbers - or 5.5%. I have
rounded to 6%, as I have the impression from talking with those at Tyler that the
defective equipment does have a strong impact on the plant; given the uncertainly,
it seems just as good a guess as 5.5%
Moreover, I have similarly estimated the natural lifetime of the average part
to be roughly 14 years. Too much higher and very few breakdowns occur; too much
lower and there are an unrealistically low amount of corrective maintenance jobs
generated.
Broken Down Equipment Discovery Rate
We assume that initially, 75% of all broken-down equipment is discovered as
being broken down and listed on the SRT log that same week. This number can
increase, as the level of preventive, exploratory work done in the plant increases.
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Why 75% per week? We know that the number cannot be 100%, as during an
outage many pieces of broken-down equipment and defective equipment are freshly
discovered. In fact, at Headquarters we were told that as much as 40% of the work
done in outage is from defective and broken down equipment not known about
before the outage. In short, 50% seemed like too low a discovery rate, allowing
undiscovered broken down equipment to pile up too quickly, and 100% was clearly
too high. So in absence of further data, 75% seems like a good starting point.
We know, moreover, that the percentage of broken down equipment being
discovered each week must depend on how much workers are examining all aspects
of the plant: it depends therefore on the amount of preventive maintenance being
done, the amount of corrective maintenance, and the presence of operations staff in
the plant. Therefore, we should not use a fixed 75%, but a number which varies.
But since we have only the roughest of ideas of what the percentage should be, and
in order to reduce the complexity of the model, we shall use the fixed number.
Assuming 75% of broken down equipment is listed on the SRT log that same
week, this means that to get a flow of 150 pieces of equipment in the first week we
need 200 (which is 150 / .75) pieces of undiscovered broken down pieces of
equipment initially.
Staffing and Productivity Assumptions
At Tyler Headquarters we were told that a good assumption for the number of
man-hours available in Tyler One's maintenance team is to take 225 people and
assume a "capacity factor" of 80%. What Tyler Headquarters defines as "capacity
factor" is simply a measure of the percentage of time actually available for work,
considering sick leave, vacations, etc.; it is the percentage of the entire maintenance
force that is present, on average, any given day. Assuming that there are 225 people
in maintenance, that about three men are sent out to do each job, that each team of
three men do an average of one job per day, that the workweek for maintenance is
four days, and that the capacity factor is 80%, about 240 jobs/week may be
accomplished.
By the last meeting I held with the Work Process Control Managers, the
estimate given to me for the number of maintenance personnel was 150. The
productivity per week of each person was earlier estimated by a plant study to be 2
jobs. The capacity factor was still felt to be 80%. Interestingly, this still works out to
a maintenance capacity of 240 jobs/week (150*2*0.80 = 240). This may tell us
something about staffing policy: on the surface, the goal seems to be to increase
productivity, and then get rid of the excess capacity generated. This is a policy that
we may want to analyze in further detail.
At the beginning of the project I was told that each SRT shift was composed of
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10 members, and that there were 14 twelve-hour shifts per week. Because of
vacations, sick leave, etc., a nine-member shift would be more accurate, according to
Tyler Headquarters. However, at a later meeting with the Work Process Managers
from the three sites in November, I was told that a better approximation for a SRT
shift would be six to seven members, as there have since been staffing reductions.
SRT usually does work in teams of two. At Headquarters, I was told that a
team of two could accomplish essentially one task per day, as they must be their own
planners and schedulers, along with doing the maintenance. During my
observation of the SRT team, which came about a month later, the head of the SRT
shift on duty estimated that the two-man team averaged about two jobs per shift.
But at the November meeting at Tyler One, several months later still, there was
consensus that a two-man crew could accomplish three and possibly even four jobs
a day. The estimate from Headquarters gives us a total SRT capacity to do work at
45.5 jobs per week (6.5 (workers/ SRT shift) / 2 (workers/team) * 1 (job/team) * 14
SRT shifts/week = 45.5 jobs/week). The SRT shift head's estimate gives us twice
that, or 91 jobs/week, and the Work Process Manager's estimate gives us a capacity
of 159.25 jobs/week (6.5 (workers/SRT shift) / 2 (workers/team) * 3.5 (jobs/team) *
14 (SRT shifts/week) = 159.25 jobs/week). (Or 136.5 jobs/week if assume 3
jobs/team). These estimates are widely discrepant, and over time will have a
tremendous impact on the status of equipment in the plant.
This discrepancy in estimates on productivity is important data. It is a good
example of how the modeling effort can help surface such disagreements.
Of course, if we assume that, as in the case of the maintenance crew, the
productivity of SRT members has increased over time, we should look at the
capacity of SRT as it stood when those at Headquarters gave us the estimate, as the
estimate was given the earliest of the three. Assuming 9 workers per shift, 14 shifts
per week, 2 workers per team, and 1 job per team, we have a total capacity of 63 jobs
per week. This estimate is still much below the 160 jobs per week calculated based
on the Work Process Control managers' input. This tells us that we should be
careful with this estimate, and test the sensitivity of the model to it to see how
much it matters.
Rather than picking either extremes, it seems reasonable to take the estimate
in between -- assuming a two-person team can accomplish two jobs in a day; and a
SRT shift team size of 6.5, yielding a SRT capacity of 91 jobs per week.
I realize that the definition of "a piece of equipment," "a work order," and
other such terms are problematic and differ depend on whom you are talking to.
But our approach has been to gather data from one source -- Tyler One -- and rely on
their measures to be internally consistent. When the modeling process reveals
discrepancies, that becomes an interesting point of discussion and learning.
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Table 1 -- A Summary of the Model's Initial Conditions
Tyler One Data
Maintenance Backlog 1600 pieces (Tyler One Data, April)
SRT Backlog 91/2 = 45.5 pieces (or 1/2 a week's worth)
I was given a cycle time of roughly half a week for SRT completion of work. So, it
seems logical that SRT's initial backlog should be half a week.
Corrective Maint. work order rate
Mandatory Preventive Maint. Rate
from Defective OpEquip
from Perfectly OpEquip
Total work orders
Total Amount of Equipment
150 pieces/week
150 pieces/week
75 pieces/week
75 pieces/week
300/week
107,000 pieces
Other Data
Defective parts breakdown on average within
14 weeks. (From MIT study).
Breakdown rate
Assumptions
BD Discovery rate
Defective Equipment
Discovery Rate
Defect Rate
75% of actual broken down equipment is
discovered per week.
5% of Def. Equip. discovered per week.
Defects equally result from normal
equipment aging and the excess strain
defective parts put on fully operational parts.
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Calculated Assumptions (Based on Data)
PM (preventive maint) takedown 181 pieces
150 Programmed Maintenance tasks and a leftover capacity for 31 pieces of
discovered defective operating equipment.
Broken Down Discovered Equipment 150*.25 = 37.5 pieces
Note: each time step, the BD discovered equipment is sent to SRT and
maintenance; since the dt is .25, and the flow is 150 per week, there is an initial
value of 37.5 pieces of equipment.
Broken Down Undiscovered Equip. 150/.75 = 200 pieces
Note: based on discovering 75% of broken down equip. per week.
Defective Operating Equipment 2100 pieces (14 weeks * 150 parts/wk)
Undiscovered Defective 1900 pieces
Discovered Defective 200 pieces (or roughly 10% of 2100)
Perfectly Operating Equipment 102,839.5 (out of total of 107,000 pieces)
Note: here, I just subtracted all of the -other stocks from 107,000, which I was given
as the total number of pieces of equipment at Tyler One.
Defect rate: (Def. Operating Equipment)*.06 + (Perfect Operating Equip)/(14*52)
Personnel and Productivity
Total Maintenance Personnel 150 workers
Total SRT Personnel 32.5 workers (6.5 workers/shift * 5 shifts)
Maintenance Productivity 240 jobs/wk
150 workers* 2 jobs/worker/week* 0.80 capacity factor = 240 jobs/week
SRT Productivity 91 jobs/wk
6.5 workers per shift * 14 shifts / 2 workers per team * 2 jobs per shift per team =
91 jobs/wk
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Chapter VII: Policy Experimentation With the
Tyler Model
Using the initial conditions presented, we will now run several simulations
with the model. The goal will be to see how the model responds to different
maintenance policies, and to see what lessons may be learned from the model.
Run 1: Normal Operation
For brevity and clarity, other model runs will be compared to this one.
Maintenance tasks are, in order of priority: Programmed Maintenance,
Corrective Maintenance, and Discovered Defective Operating Equipment. SRT tasks
are, in order of priority: SRT Corrective Maintenance, and Discovered Defective
Operating Equipment. Any additional capacity to do work after all of these are
finished will result in doing extra programmed maintenance.
The initial conditions, as calculated in the preceding chapter, are used. The
Maintenance desired backlog is 1600 pieces of equipment, which is also the initial
value of the backlog. This is roughly backlog Tyler One actually had in May, 1995.
For the sake of clarity, this run also makes the simplification that no errors
are introduced into equipment that is being worked on, whether preventive
maintenance or corrective maintenance is being done. Since I have no data on what
those numbers might be, it seems a fair approximation that the process of having
work orders closed out would serve to double check work done by maintenance
crews and that therefore relatively few errors would be made; it also seems logical
that even though SRT jobs are not generally subjected to evaluation by a separate
team in order to be closed out, the nature of the tasks done by SRT are simpler than
that done by maintenance, and therefore there would also be few errors made. In
Programmed Maintenance, we would expect the least number of errors of all, as the
tasks are performed regularly, and therefore are more thoroughly planned out and
personnel have more experience executing them.
The simulation time is one year, divided into 52 weeks. We assume that a
planned outage has occurred just before the run begins, and so it is not necessary to
have one during the simulation.
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It should be noted that there are two different scales on this graph.
Curve #1, the percent of all plant equipment (out of 107,000 pieces) that is
operating without defects, starts at its maximum of 96.11%, and dips down to 95.99%
by the end of week 52.
Curve #2 is the number of pieces of equipment operating with defects but not
yet known to be defective; curve #3 is the number of pieces of defective operating
equipment which have been discovered; and curve #4 represents the number of
pieces of broken down (but not yet known to maintenance to be broken down)
equipment. For curves 2 through 4, the maximum at the top of the graph is 2250
pieces of equipment and the minimum is at zero.
We see that despite the best efforts of the maintenance team and SRT, the
percentage of perfectly operating equipment declines. However, it declines less
rapidly as the simulation progresses, signaling that maintenance and SRT are
making slow and steady progress in improving the plant.
We already see that the plant can be worsening even as workers are actually
performing quite well; this is a fact that is not always apparent when managers
expect immediate results from improving productivity or other similar measures --
Page 48
22
it takes time to actually see the results. This lag between the implementation of a
policy and seeing the effects of that policy can easily lead people to draw the wrong
conclusions about a system; it is therefore something important to be aware of.
The number of pieces of undiscovered defective equipment declines, while
the number of pieces of discovered defective equipment rises. From inspecting the
graph, it seems that the decline in the former corresponds quite well to the rise in
the latter.
Since the amount of discovered defective equipment becomes quite constant
after about week 20, we know that the amount of defective equipment being
discovered each week is equal to the amount of discovered defective equipment
being repaired plus the amount of discovered defective equipment breaking down
as a result of not being worked on in that week. This tells us that we may want to
consider adding more capacity or improving productivity so that we can repair
equipment faster than it is discovered, in order to work the backlog of discovered
defective equipment down. In reality, there does tend to be a buildup of work orders
until outage, which tends to suggest that there are reasons why this extra capacity is
not added (such as budgetary constraints).
Let us now take a look at the backlogs of the regular maintenance
organization and of SRT, and see how'they compare to target backlogs:
Backlogs
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Here, too, we must be careful to note that there are two different scales on this
graph: between 0 and 1900 for the maintenance organization (curves 1 and 2), and
between 0 and 190 for SRT (curves 3, 4, and 5).
We see here that curve #1 (Maintenance repair) initially starts at 1600 pieces
of equipment, and continues upwards. It never approaches curve #2 (the desired
maintenance backlog). There are more pieces of equipment waiting to be worked on
than we would like, despite the best efforts of the maintenance team. The 150 items
of programmed maintenance, which comes first in priority, take up so much of its
energy that it doesn't have the time to spare to work down the corrective
maintenance backlog.
We see an entirely different situation for SRT. SRT was designed to be a rapid
response team. To allow it to accumulate a large backlog would cause its cycle time
to spiral upwards, and it would cease to be able to handle jobs on short notice.
Therefore, I have set its maximum backlog to be equal to a half a week's capacity (or
roughly 40 jobs). SRT can do about 50% of the jobs that get entered into the whole
maintenance system, and so it will continue to accept this many jobs; but it will not
allow its backlog to climb above 40, and so it sends any jobs that would cause the
backlog to go over 40 to the regular maintenance organization, even if the jobs are
well in the purview of SRT to handle.
We see a steady transfer rate from SRT to the maintenance organization,
which tells us that we might try altering the backlog limit, or we might think about
what adding extra SRT capacity would do for the system. We note that there is a
transient in the transfer rate shortly after the start of the simulation. What happens
here is that when the SRT repair plus the incoming SRT work is equal to the SRT
return to service plus the maximum backlog, the transfer rate reaches zero.
However, the next week the new corrective work pushes the SRT repair over the
backlog, and there is a large, brief transfer over to maintenance. A steady state of
transfers is then soon reached. These transients will be seen in future simulations,
and have little impact on overall dynamics.
Safety
One way safety can be defined is in terms of the chance of something going
wrong, and the chance of an emergency system working in the case that something
has gone wrong. The higher percentage of your equipment in perfect operating
condition, the less the chance that something will go wrong, and the greater the
chance that a safety system will work if something does go wrong.
Usually when something "goes wrong," it is in terms of a forced outage: the
plant was forced to shut down because something undesirable unexpectedly
happened. Essentially, the same things that cause a forced outage can cause an
accident. So we can think of the probability of a forced outage as a proxy for the
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safety of the plant.
Moreover, the more forced outages you actually have, the less electricity you
make, and therefore the less profitable your plant is. So there is a direct connection
between safety and profitability.
Forced
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1:
2:
Outages
Power Production 2: prob of forced outage
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Here we see that there was a forced outage around week 25, where the
percentage of power produced went from 100% down to 0%. One forced outage a
year is pretty much the US nuclear industry average. This corresponds to about a
2% chance per week of a forced outage, which is roughly what we have here.
We also see something else: the probability for a forced outage has risen from
1.94% per week at the beginning of the simulation to 2.01% per week at the end of
the year. This does not seem to be a very big change at all; it seems that our plant at
the end of the year is only marginally less safe than it was in the beginning.
Nevertheless, we would like to see the probability decreasing if at all possible.
In sum, the percent of perfect operating equipment is declining, but by the
end of the year it seems things are under control. The probability of a forced outage
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hasn't risen that much. Still, we'd like to see the corrective maintenance backlog
worked down.
Run #2: Drastic Backlog Reduction
In this run, from the outset the policy is not to be content with a backlog of
1600, but to not stop working down the backlog until it has reached 800. And we
want it to happen within eight weeks. Since less backlog seems better, this seems
like a reasonable and beneficial policy.
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The results of this policy are counter-intuitive. We see that the percentage of
perfectly operating equipment has not dropped from 96.11% to 95.99%, but from
96.11% down to 95.88% (see curve #1). Working to cut the backlog in half actually
has resulted in a plant in which fewer pieces of equipment are in perfect operation.
Moreover, the discovered defective operating equipment seems to reach
equilibrium at a higher level than before.
Let us examine the backlogs to see what additional information we might
gain.
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The scale on this graph for maintenance backlog had to be adjusted to
accommodate a backlog which reaches roughly 2000 pieces of equipment by the end
of the year, about 100 pieces higher than in the base case.
Last, it would be helpful to look at the probability of forced outages.
Page 53
Backlo
,1:.
23145
gs
Outages
Power Production
1
2: prob of forced outage
Forced
1:F
1:
2:
1:
2:
1:
2:
\J8 4
Although here as well we had one forced outage, the probability of a forced
outage has risen to 2.12% instead of 2.01%.
There is little question that the policy of a backlog reduction by half in eight
weeks is inferior to that of being satisfied with a backlog of 1600. Why is this so?
As we-have only a certain capacity to do work, based on the number of
maintenance workers and their productivity, requiring that more corrective work is
done (decreasing the Maintenance backlog) means that there is less capacity to do
PM work. Therefore, very few PMs, outside of those that are mandatory, are actually
done. Even equipment which is known to be operating and defective is not worked
on because of the need to concentrate on the Maintenance backlog. Therefore,
defects are not removed before they lead to a breakdown. By not doing elective PMs,
the plant is in more of a reactive mode of maintenance.
We already have an important finding: devoting resources to defective
operating equipment can be more beneficial to the plant than devoting those same
resources to repairing equipment that is completely broken. In most industries,
preventive maintenance does not have such a significant programmed component;
and in these cases, frequently it is the preventive work that is omitted when budgets
are tight. This model suggests that cutting preventive work may not be such a good
idea.
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I would hypothesize that the performance of the plant would have been
much worse in this run if the programmed maintenance program were smaller or
nonexistent. Programmed maintenance insures that even if you want to focus all
your energies on corrective work, you can't.
Run #3: Doubling SRT's Maximum Backlog
What would happen if we were to double the acceptable backlog of SRT? We
saw in the base case that there was a steady and significant transfer of tasks from SRT
to the regular maintenance organization simply because SRT would be exceeding its
backlog limit were it to accept them. Perhaps increasing that limit would mean that
there would be fewer transfers, that SRT would be doing more work, and that a
plant in better condition would result.
As always, the model is reset to the base case conditions with the exception of
the one change being tested (the SRT maximum backlog size). So, for example, the
regular maintenance organization is once again satisfied with a corrective
maintenance backlog of 1600 pieces of equipment.
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The plant in this run is quantitatively and qualitatively different than in the
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previous runs. Not only does it decline to having the lowest percentage of perfectly
operating equipment so far (at 94.79%), the plant actually seems to be getting worse
at a progressively faster rate. The amount of defective operating equipment, both
discovered and undiscovered, are in no way constant, but are climbing. The
amount of broken down equipment, roughly constant in the previous two runs,
continually climbs here.
Let us again look at the backlogs and the probabilities for forced outages.
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At first glance, the maintenance backlog seems in much better shape than in
either of the first two runs. The maintenance organization is able to either meet or
hover close to the 1600 piece desired backlog most of the time. Only in the end does
it seem to lose the battle, with the backlog continually rising. Why is this
happening?
The maintenance backlog is more controlled for most of the run here because,
as we see from curve #5, there is not a constant level of transfers of jobs from SRT to
the regular maintenance organization. Therefore, maintenance can meet its backlog
targets better because SRT is not sending it nearly so much work to do. Towards the
end of the run, around week 40, this begins to change; since SRT has done a bit less
than was sent to it each week, as evidenced by the climbing SRT backlog, it
eventually reaches the new maximum backlog, and begins to transfer work over to
the regular maintenance organization.
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It is plain that SRT simply does not have the resources to do the entire 50% of
the work of the plant that it is capable of doing. Therefore, no matter what its
maximum backlog is set at, it will eventually reach that backlog and begin regularly
sending work to the regular maintenance organization.
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We have had not one, but two forced outages this year. And the probability of
having a forced outage has climbed to 3.42% by the end of the year, almost double
the 1.94% we started out with and which is the industry average.
We see that increasing the maximum backlog of SRT is a decidedly bad policy.
But why is this so?
Referring back to the first graph of this run, we see that the number of pieces
of equipment operating with defects climbs markedly throughout the year, whereas
before it always reached some steady-state. The reason this happens is because SRT
is now so busy with handling every piece of broken equipment that comes its way
that it no longer has time to work on equipment that is just operating with a defect.
This allows defects to pile up. More defective operating equipment means more
equipment will become broken down. Perhaps more importantly, more defective
equipment causes more perfectly operating equipment to become defective because
of the stress defective equipment places on perfectly functional equipment.
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Our decision to increase the maximum backlog of SRT and to get it to share
more of the corrective load with the regular maintenance organization has kept
SRT from doing elective preventive maintenance. And this run argues that
allowing SRT the flexibility to do that elective preventive maintenance can be more
valuable than forcing it to shoulder more of the corrective maintenance burden.
Perhaps this is part of what is meant by having SRT serve as a "rapid response
team, " and as a team which handles "work requests" (which are in general less
serious than work orders -- the difference between broken down and defective
equipment, for example). By keeping the SRT maximum corrective backlog low,
SRT is free to work on the numerous defects as they come up; and in doing so, it is
doing elective preventive maintenance (although those at Tyler don't call it that).
It is interesting that both policies that we have tried - a larger reduction in
the corrective maintenance backlog and requiring SRT to do a greater amount of
incoming corrective work - seem beneficial on the surface, but produce negative
results.
Run #4: The Elimination of SRT
This sounds like a drastic change indeed, and it is. We will essentially go back
to the days before SRT was implemented. All of the SRT workers ( 6.5 workers/shift
* 5 shifts of workers = 32.5 workers) will be transferred to the regular maintenance
department, to which 100% of the corrective work will flow. The initial SRT
backlog, 42 pieces of equipment, will be transferred to the corrective maintenance
backlog, giving it an initial value of 1642 pieces of equipment.
A major question in moving the workers over to maintenance is how
productive each member of the new, expanded force will be. One argument is that
the workers would have the same productivity as it was before; as relatively few
workers will be joining a larger group, the paperwork, scheduling, planning, and
other requirements of the organization will be controlling and the productivity of
each member will probably not change. Another point of view is that since SRT is
being disbanded, and since generally simpler jobs went to SRT, the overall
maintenance organization will have, on average, simpler jobs to accomplish. This
means that, even with paperwork, planning, scheduling, etc., their productivity
should actually increase.
It is interesting to note that those at Tyler were divided as to which would
actually happen. The strength of a model is that it is possible to explore both
possibilities.
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4A : No Change in Maintenance Productivity
In this run we will assume that the productivity of each member of the
maintenance force does not change when SRT is eliminated. Instead of being
capable of doing 91 jobs per week, the same 32.5 people in the regular maintenance
organization can only accomplish 52 jobs per week (32.5 people * 2 jobs/week * .8
capacity factor).
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The number of pieces of defective operating equipment, both discovered and
undiscovered, are steadily increasing here. The number of pieces of broken down
equipment seems to be increasing even faster than in the previous run.
Perhaps most importantly, the percentage of perfectly operating equipment
has fallen to 91.46%, by far the lowest of any of the runs so far.
To gather further information, let us examine the backlogs and probabilities
for forced outages.
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Again, it is important to note that the graph's scale goes from 1600 to 5000
pieces of equipment on the y-axis. The expanded regular maintenance organization
seems to hold its own for the first few weeks, with the corrective maintenance
backlog staying right at about the target of 1600 pieces of equipment. However, it
soon loses its ability to keep up with the incoming work orders, and the small
weekly difference in what it should do and what it is able to do adds up to a
tremendous backlog by the end of the year. At nearly 5000 pieces of equipment, the
backlog is by far the worst of any of the runs we have tried so far.
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There were four forced outages over the year. And by the end of the year, the
probability of a forced outage is 14.72% per week. The plant is not in good shape,
and probably would not have been allowed to continue on this long without a
forced outage.
Are things this bad just because we, in effect, decreased productivity by
shifting SRT over to maintenance? We can test this by looking at what would
happen if we increased the productivity of the new maintenance organization to
equal the productivity of the old maintenance organization plus the old SRT, or
240+91 = 331 jobs/week.
4B : Conservation of Work Capacity
Here, we increase the average number of jobs each worker is able to complete
in a week from 2 to 2.267. How did I get this number? It is the number necessary to
force the new, expanded maintenance organization to have the same capacity to do
work as the old maintenance organization plus SRT combined.
(182.5 workers * X * .8 capacity factor = 331 jobs/week ; X = 2.267).
If anything, this is an overestimate of what the expanded maintenance
organization could do. Some argue that the primary value of SRT is that it provides
a way to get things done in a hopelessly complex and tortured maintenance system.
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If that is the case (or even somewhat the case), then it is unlikely that transferring
the SRT workers over to the regular maintenance organization would allow for a
conservation of the capacity to do jobs. Some of that capacity would probably be lost
in the red tape inevitably surrounding the way maintenance is normally done.
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As we expect, the percentage of perfectly operating equipment does not
decline as low as it did in run 4A, where the productivity of workers was lower.
However, the same general trend is the same here. Unlike the base case, where the
decline of the plant had been arrested, here the plant seems to get progressively
worse each week.
At this point we should ask ourselves: is this really what the base case of the
plant looked like before SRT was introduced? It could well be that before SRT was
introduced, there was indeed a lot more equipment to work on during outage
periods that had built up over operation. Or, it could be that maintenance had a
slightly higher productivity before SRT was introduced.
As we don't have the information to properly evaluate this question, let's
continue without changing our assumptions on productivity. Next we examine the
corrective maintenance backlog.
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The y-axis has been again changed to reflect the size of the backlog at the end
of the simulation. The expanded maintenance organization is capable of keeping its
backlog to the desired level quite well -- until about week 32, that is. Then it
increases rapidly, to over 2200 pieces of equipment.
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There are two forced outages, and the probability of a forced outage has
climbed to 6.22% by the end of the year. Again, certainly not as bad as in run 4A,
where the overall productivity was lower, but certainly worse than in the base case,
where the probability of a forced outage climbed to only 2.07% per week by the end
of the year.
We can clearly see that, no matter which assumption you make about the
productivity of the new, enlarged maintenance force, removing SRT reduces the
percentage of perfectly operating equipment, increases the corrective maintenance
backlog, and increases the probability of a forced outage. Assuming that the actual
productivity of maintenance was not higher than was assumed in the previous
simulation, getting rid of SRT is bad policy. But why is this so? If the capacity to do
work is conserved, as it was in run 4B, then what is the difference in having SRT
and not having it?
The difference is twofold. First, the fact that all personnel are in the regular
maintenance organization means that, according to our priority system, their first
priority is the corrective maintenance backlog. As even under the optimistic
productivity scenario (4B), there is a struggle to keep the backlog at the desired level
of 1600, there is very little manpower left over to correct the discovered defective
operating equipment. With SRT keeping its original maximum corrective backlog
to half a week's worth of jobs, this meant that roughly the other half week's worth
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of capacity could be devoted to the discovered defective equipment. This is the rapid
response nature of SRT: there is the freedom to work on more minor problems
(work requests) before they become more serious. But when all workers are moved
to the regular maintenance organization and subject to its priority system, these
more minor problems must await any "extra capacity" left over after (and if)
corrective backlog targets are achieved. And not only do these pieces of defective
operating equipment left unattended break down themselves, they put stress on
other pieces of operating equipment and cause more defects.
Second, SRT allows for equipment to be repaired in short order, as opposed to
the regular maintenance organization, where a piece of equipment generally waits
many weeks before being repaired. Somewhere close to 50% of the non-
programmed maintenance work done each week is done by SRT. This includes
corrective work and elective preventive maintenance (work on discovered defective
operating equipment). This means that a piece of discovered defective equipment is
much more likely to be processed quickly through SRT than it is through the
regular maintenance organization, and so there is less time for it to cause other
pieces of equipment to become defective and less a chance that it will be ignored so
long that it will break down itself. It also means that a piece of broken down
equipment spends less time out-of-order and waiting to be fixed; it is quickly
returned to perfect operating condition.
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Run #5: Drastic Workforce Reduction
Here we cut both the maintenance workforce and SRT in half. Of course, no
one would make such a drastic reduction. But it is instructive to note what happens
when this reduction is made. The desired backlog has been reset to the original
level, 1600.
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The plant is essentially in free fall. Only 86.471% of the equipment of the
plant is perfectly operating at the end of the year, and there is no end in sight. The
amount of broken down and discovered broken down equipment are steadily
increasing and show no signs of letting up.
Let us look at our backlogs and forced outages once more.
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The scale on this graph had to be drastically altered to accommodate the
incredible increase in the maintenance backlog. The maintenance backlog is up to
around 10,000 pieces of equipment at the end of the year.
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The plant is a nightmare. There are no less than 8 forced outages over the
year. And by the end of the year, there is a 53.92% chance that there will be one
outage per week. It is clear that this plant is so unreliable that it is forcing the utility
to purchase other, more expensive forms of power. With such a high maintenance
backlog, when the plant does go into outage it is likely to be very long and costly.
Even with the drastic reduction in workforce, it is most likely that the plant is not
economical. What is sure is that it is extremely dangerous.
Run #6: Reducing Maximum SRT Corrective Backlog by Half
If increasing the maximum SRT corrective backlog tends to worsen the
condition of the plant by keeping SRT from doing elective preventive maintenance,
perhaps decreasing that maximum backlog and allowing SRT to do more elective
preventive maintenance would benefit the plant. Again, we reset the number of
workers and all other parameters, save the SRT maximum backlog, to the base-case
scenario.
Let us reduce the maximum backlog by half (equal to 1/4 of a week's worth of
work, instead of 1/2 a week's worth of work), and turn to the model to find out.
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For the first time, we have done something to actually improve the plant.
The percentage of perfectly operating equipment, after a slight initial drop to 96.08,
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has risen to 96.96 by the end of the year. The amount of defective operating
equipment, both discovered and undiscovered, is steadily decreasing over time. The
amount of discovered defective operating equipment is perhaps most notable, as it
seems that the extra capacity SRT now has to work on it has caused the backlog to
decrease to quite low levels. Because SRT is effective at getting rid of these defects
before they have much time to cause other pieces of equipment to become defective,
fewer pieces of equipment are becoming defective, so the amount of undiscovered
defective operating equipment is steadily decreasing as well.
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After climbing to an initial backlog of near 2100, the regular maintenance
organization is able to get things under control and to start bringing the backlog
down towards the desired 1600 mark. The reason they are able to make progress is
because of the elective preventive maintenance done by SRT. It has succeeded in
reducing the number of defects entering the system, so by about week 26 the
maintenance team is working less on new work orders entering the system and
more on existing work orders.
We again see the important lesson of a delayed reaction. The elective
preventive maintenance done by SRT is important for improving the plant; but for
the first half of the year, the program actually causes the corrective maintenance
backlog to rise. It would be very easy, and in fact natural, to conclude that the
program was not beneficial. However, this would be mistaken.
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SRT transfers more corrective work to the regular maintenance organization
than it deals with itself for most of the year; however, by the end of the year, it has
been so effective in reducing the rate at which defects are caused that it has less of a
corrective maintenance backlog, and so it doesn't have to transfer as much to the
regular maintenance organization.
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We see that although the percentage of programmed maintenance is just
under 50%, the amount of preventive maintenance is closer to 70%. And by the end
of the year, the percentage of both programmed and preventive maintenance has
begun to rise, simply because there are fewer defects entering the system, and the
productivity and number of workers has remained the same; therefore, the extra
capacity must be used on increased preventive and programmed maintenance.
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It is no surprise that the probability of having a forced outage has declined. It
is interesting to note that we still had one forced outage, even though our plant is
getting better. This again argues that many of the concrete results from our actions
are delayed, and so it would be a mistake to think that because there was one forced
outage that the plant is no better than it was on a previous year where the policies of
the base case scenario, for example, were implemented.
Run #7: Increasing the Effectiveness of the PMO program
In the base case, programmed maintenance is equally likely to do preventive
work on perfectly operating equipment as it is on defective operating equipment.
Obviously, it would be nice to be more likely to do work the defective equipment.
Of course, for many pieces of equipment there are stringent guidelines mandating
when preventive maintenance must be done; even if a particular NPP thinks that
the equipment should be worked on less often, they must follow the NRC's
schedule.
However, for many other pieces of equipment either the NRC gives more
broad guidelines, or decisions about the frequency of preventive maintenance are
completely up to the NPP. In this run, we shall see how the plant performs over
time if it is able to draw 60% of its programmed maintenance work from defective
operating equipment, and only 40% from perfectly operating equipment.
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The fraction of perfect operating equipment is up to 97.88%, a large increase.
The number of pieces of defective equipment, both discovered and undiscovered,
are continually falling, as is the number of broken down pieces of equipment.
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After initially heading upwards towards 1900 pieces of equipment, the
maintenance CM backlog is completely under control and at the desired level. The
number of pieces of broken down equipment has declined to the degree that SRT is
having fewer and fewer corrective tasks by the end of the year.
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Finally, we see that the decreasing amount of broken down equipment
entering the system each week gives both maintenance and SRT the ability to
perform more preventive maintenance. The plant is well on its way to becoming
almost completely proactive. Such a completely proactive plant is not fiction; there
are NPPs, perhaps most notably in Japan, that do almost 100% preventive
maintenance (13).
It is instructive that a seemingly small change in the effectiveness of the PMO
program can produce such a large change in the overall status of the plant.
Run #8: Testing the Robustness of Policy Conclusions
It is clear that there are certain parameters that the model is very sensitive to,
most notably estimates of the productivity of the workers. And it is also worrisome
that different people within Tyler gave me different estimates of these important
parameters.
Because of the differences in these estimates, it is hard to have any confidence
in the model as a predictor of exactly what the plant would look like if a certain
policy were followed. However, are the policy conclusions of the model fairly
robust, regardless of what estimates we use for these sensitive parameters? Do we
have confidence that the recommendations of the model for good policy hold across
a wide range of estimates?
Here we will increase the productivity estimate for a two-man SRT team
from 2 jobs per shift to 3. In order to keep accordance with our rule that the SRT
backlog is equal to half a week's capacity to do work, we shall accordingly adjust the
SRT maximum backlog. As the total SRT ability to do work is now 136.5 jobs per
week (6.5 (workers/shift) / 2 (workers/team) * 3 (jobs/team) * 14 shifts = 136.5).
Moreover, since we assume that the starting backlog of SRT is equal to half a week's
worth of work, we will change its initial backlog to 68.25 and adjust the number of
perfectly operating equipment accordingly. We will leave the estimate for the
regular maintenance organization unchanged, as those at Tyler are more in
agreement on the estimate.
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The plant is performing extremely well. The fraction of perfect operating
equipment is up to 98.38% at the end of the run. The extra SRT capacity of three jobs
per two man team is primarily used for elective preventive maintenance, as SRT
has a strict limit on how many work orders it has at any given time (i.e. it has a strict
backlog limit).
Let's also take a look at the state of the backlogs in this run.
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We see that maintenance, after an initial struggle, is able to maintain its
desired backlog. And SRT is having less and less work to do because the preventive
maintenance is effective in slowing down the rate at which equipment is breaking
down. We can also look at the graph of the percentage of preventive maintenance.
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By the end of the year, the plant is doing almost 100% preventive
maintenance. It is questionable whether the estimate of three jobs per two-man
SRT team is accurate, as the plant seems to perform far better than most actual NPPs
actually do. But, for the sake of seeing whether this estimate affects policy
conclusions, we'll try decreasing the desired maintenance backlog level from 1600 to
800, which caused a slightly worse performance in a previous run.
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Instead of having a percentage of perfectly operating equipment of 98.38% at
the end of the year, we have 98.67% perfectly operating. It seems that we actually
have done better. But we can also see that whereas in the previous simulation our
defective operating equipment had practically gone to zero, here we are somewhere
around 500 pieces. We shall again examine the backlogs and percentage of
preventive maintenance to further our understanding of the behavior of this
simulation.
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What has happened is that in the previous simulation, we devoted more
resources to preventive maintenance, which eliminated our defective equipment
faster. This caused progressively fewer defects to be introduced each week, but it left
a corrective backlog of 1600 in maintenance. Reducing the desired backlog to 800
insured that 800 more pieces of equipment would be perfectly operating by the end
of the year, but also meant that there would not be as much capacity to focus on
elective preventive maintenance. Therefore, more pieces were becoming defective
per week and breaking down than when the desired backlog was set at 1600.
Which run is better for the plant? I would argue that the first run, with a
corrective backlog of 1600 pieces, is better. At the end of that run, the plant was
operating almost completely proactively. At that point, when there is virtually no
defective equipment to be causing other defects, it seems logical to reduce the
desired corrective maintenance backlog and bring the percentage of perfect operating
equipment up higher.
Even though the change in assumption of SRT productivity has affected the
results, and has made the tradeoffs between the two different desired corrective
maintenance backlog policies more difficult to compare, it has not altered the basic
fact that demanding more work on corrective maintenance takes away the capacity
to do elective preventive maintenance.
Next, we might try doubling the SRT maximum backlog, in order to see
whether it harms the plant under the new SRT productivity assumptions. The
desired corrective maintenance backlog is reset to the base case level of 1600.
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Here, the maximum is 98.37% perfectly operating equipment, as opposed to
98.38% in the first simulation in run #8. Interestingly, doubling the SRT maximum
backlog seems not to have harmed the plant at all. Why is this so?
Perhaps we should look at the backlogs to find out.
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The actual SRT backlog never even approached the 136.5 maximum limit we
set for it. It is now clear why changing increasing the maximum backlog did not
harm the plant: the excess SRT capacity was so much that it was bound to do a lot of
elective preventive maintenance, no matter how high the maximum backlog was
set.
Policy Experimentation: A Summary
We have seen that there is indeed sensitivity to initial conditions and
parameters. However, the ramifications of that sensitivity depends on which initial
conditions and parameters we are talking about.
Certain Conclusions
There are certain things that hold true no matter what initial conditions are
used. A better Preventive Maintenance Optimization (PMO) program always helps
the plant; the initial conditions would just determine whether it helps a
tremendous amount or merely a great deal. A preventive maintenance program
outside of programmed maintenance (meaning work on discovered defective
operating equipment) is always beneficial, as it always works to reduce the number
of perfectly operating pieces of equipment that become defective each week.
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Moreover, the plant is always extremely sensitive to estimates of worker
productivity, and to the number of workers at the plant.
Exposing the Need for Data
Through finding what was most sensitive to the model's output, we can get
an idea for what information is truly important. Interestingly, it seems that much
information that is truly important for the behavior of the system as a whole is not
currently gathered. An effort to discover what factors influence worker productivity
and to what degree, and to measure the productivity of workers across the
maintenance organization would likely help in planning worker staffing levels. An
effort to measure the rate at which equipment becomes defective, and the rate at
which defective operating equipment becomes discovered would help in better
understanding what sort of CM-elective PM balance would be optimal.
Specific Recommendations
A common theme of the model runs is that the system can behave in
unexpected ways. This shows that it is not enough to assume you know how the
system will respond; it is necessary to think carefully about how the policies you set
influence other parts of the system. This is an important finding: if you do not
believe that a system can behave in unexpected ways, you will not be on guard to
think carefully about the ramifications of your policy decisions.
Moreover, because we see how sensitive the model is to certain parameters, it
is perhaps best used as a tool by those who operate the NPPs themselves. They are
most familiar with the state of their equipment, and they would be able to do
sensitivity analyses to test how policies produce different results depending on what
assumptions are used. The model thus is able to provide a rough idea of the
different ways the plant could respond to a policy, and thus alert personnel to be
cautious when the results of policies vary widely depending on the assumptions
used.
Both the model and the modeling process itself bring up many issues worthy
of reflection. These I shall deal with in the following chapter.
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Chapter VIII - Conclusions
Reflections on the Model
Is the Model Too Simple?
A very obvious criticism of the model is that it seems far too simple. All
pieces of equipment are not the same; some, such as the diesel generator or the
emergency high-pressure core coolant injection system, are absolutely critical to the
safety of a nuclear power plant. Others, such as a lighting system in some part of the
plant, matter very little to the operation of the plant - the equipment works fine in
the dark, thank you. This shows as well that a defect in one type of equipment could
have a large impact on creating defects in other pieces of equipment, whereas a
defect in another type of equipment may have very little impact on other pieces of
equipment indeed.
Moreover, none of the simulation runs even had a planned outage in them.
However, it must be kept in mind that the whole goal of the modeling
process is to reduce the system to its essentials. Physicists, for example, when they
describe the moon's orbit around the Earth, start off by saying, "let us imagine the
moon and the Earth as point masses..." They do not consider that they must
measure the size and depth of every crater on the moon, nor take into account all of
the particulars of the surface and interior of the Earth. They have created a very
simplified model of the Earth and moon system, and it does a rather good job of
explaining what is actually observed.
Therefore, in scrutinizing a model for validity, thinking about and discussing
the lessons the model has to offer is a better test than checking to see if it has every
detail of the system included.
Doesn't the Model Use Different Definitions than Tyler Personnel Use?
Some of the definitions of different types of equipment do differ from what
Tyler personnel use.
For example, they really had no concept of "defective" equipment, either
discovered or undiscovered. In fact, I found out that their definition of "broken
down" equipment is not what most people would normally think of it as.
In a nuclear plant, very few pieces of equipment are run until they are burnt
up or completely destroyed (14). So, it seemed to me that Tyler personnel really
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have only two different categories of equipment: equipment that something is
wrong with and equipment that is operating without any problem.
Of course, they recognize that there are different degrees of there being
something wrong with equipment. And it seemed that to them, this is exactly what
the concept of "defective" equipment I've used means: equipment that is broken
down, but not quite as damaged as it could be.
This viewpoint of there being only two different categories of equipment
conflicts with data gathered at other plants. Other data suggests that certain pieces of
equipment, such as the backup diesel generator, are closely monitored for any
degradation in performance; and usually only when performance threatens to slide
below the accepted level is work done on the equipment. In this case, the
performance is degrading, so the equipment is known to have some defect; yet, it is
not considered "broken" until its performance degenerates beyond a certain point
(15).
Strangely enough, I don't believe that Tyler personnel would argue with this
data. If presented in this way, they would probably agree that there are three types of
equipment: broken down, those degrading from perfect operation but not yet broken
down, and those in perfect operation. I think it is more likely that since the
terminology I was using from model is not the same as the terminology Tyler
personnel uses, we simply misunderstood each other.
The reason I have structured the model the way I have is because I believe
that it captures something essential about the maintenance process. If a piece of
equipment is truly not operating, then it is likely that other pieces of equipment will
not be damaged because of its lack of operation: that particular pathway will not
work, so operators will switch to an alternate pathway (since in a nuclear plant,
there are generally many redundant systems).
The piece truly non-functional equipment will therefore likely cause other
pieces of equipment attached to it to not be used; it will probably not cause them to
become defective. A piece of defective operating equipment is different, however. It
is much easier to notice a piece of equipment is completely non-functional than it is
to notice that a the valve is closing in 4 seconds instead of 3, for example. And even
when it is noticed, getting a piece of truly broken equipment back in operation may
take priority over getting to the defective piece of equipment. In both cases, the
defective piece of equipment is in operation, and its less than optimum
performance places stress on other pieces of equipment attached to it.
The way the model is structured, therefore, represents a different conception
of maintenance. And I would argue that the idea of separating non-perfectly
operating equipment into categories of more-or-less non-functional and more-or-
less functional with a defect captures much more of the dynamics of maintenance
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than not separating them could capture.
In short, in choosing the categories of equipment, I have not sought to copy
the terminology and categories used at Tyler, but to have the categories of
equipment that are able to provide conceptual accuracy and richness in modeling
NPPs.
How Reliable and Useful is the Model?
After drawing up a specific list of policy recommendations, the question
comes: how good really is the model that they are based on? Given the importance
of keeping the equipment at an NPP in as good a condition as possible, should we
blindly assume that it is feeding us the right answers, especially in light of the
admitted difficulty in finding the initial conditions?
To this I can answer an unconditional no: it is no more a good idea to blindly
follow a model than it is to blindly follow someone else's advice. In both cases, we
should think about the issue ourselves. The model's output, just as a friend's
advice, is perhaps best used when we think of it as a possibility that we should
seriously consider. Does what the model says make sense? Can we reason out why
it is behaving the way it does? In getting us to ask these questions, the model is
performing a valuable service. And in deciding whether the results make sense or
not, we are in control.
And what about the problem with the initial conditions? Does the fact that
the initial conditions have imperfections mean that the model's results are not
meaningful?
To this I must answer: it depends on how the model is being used. If it is
used to try and calculate a precise number for the maintenance backlog in six
months' time, or an "optimum" number of maintenance personnel, then the initial
conditions as currently represented are indeed a severe problem.
However, if it is used to ask such questions as: "Is it generally a better policy to
give working down the maintenance backlog a higher priority than working on
discovered defective operating equipment," or "Is having an organization like SRT
beneficial, and why or why not," then the imprecision inherent in the initial
conditions do not present a problem.
The reason a model which is not perfect can be useful in analyzing policies is
that even though a particular experimental run may not be able to predict with any
great accuracy, it is still possible to compare different policy scenarios starting with
the same initial conditions. In other words, when we try to predict or optimize, we
need something with a high degree of precision; when we compare policies, all we
need to do is see how different policies perform relative to one another. Therefore,
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the degree of precision necessary for comparing model runs is much less than it
would be if we were trying to predict the precise behavior of the system.
Nevertheless, certain very sensitive parameters can fundamentally alter the
system in ways that make relative comparisons difficult. What this teaches us is the
model is a useful tool for discovering what parameters are sensitive, so that these
can be more accurately estimated. Moreover, the model allows us to get an idea of
how responses to our policies differ according to our estimates.
It is important not to compare the model to the ideal of having something
which can predict perfectly, but to the accuracy of our own mental models.
Reflections on the Model Building Process
Creating a Model Leads to Understanding
Throughout the modeling process, I noticed that people would give me
different estimates of important parameters. Not only was this true of people
having different job types and responsibilities, but of people who performed the
exact same duties.
This reveals an opportunity for learning more about what matters in
maintenance. Without having to build a model, people are free to hold their
assumptions about worker productivity, breakdown rates, etc. without ever really
having to question them; when building a model, everything important about a
system's operation must be estimated and its structure understood. Discovering
that people hold widely divergent views of important parameters is important and
valuable, and the process of figuring out why they do is even more important.
Modeling is the process of discovering what is most important to the operation and
behavior of the system. This process, and the discussion and learning that
accompany it, are perhaps more important than having a computer model.
By creating a holistic picture of how all parts of maintenance operate together,
the model allows for concrete discussion about how those with different positions
in the organization, and even people within the same divisions, view maintenance.
The model is thus useful for creating a comprehensive and detailed
framework for discussion about maintenance, both within the maintenance
organization itself and with others at Tyler Power.
In seeking to create a model which allows for learning, we had this
philosophy in mind: what is most important is not what answers the computer
gives, but what happens to the way people view maintenance. People have
traditionally relied on years of experience to teach them how parts of the system
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interact together to produce behavior. This has made it difficult for maintenance
experts to communicate with managers and others who have not had the same
experience on what the effects of policies may be.
By creating a simulation which encompasses the major aspects of the system,
it is possible to give people the equivalent of years of experience in how the overall
system operates. And managers, engineers, operators, and maintenance workers
will have a shared learning experience and a shared model from which to compare
their ideas about maintenance and policies for improving it. With this enhanced
understanding, more options can be created and explored, and better decisions
made.
Possibilities for Future Development
First, the most obvious omission in the model is the lack of a planned outage
period. I included a planned outage in a later version of the model and had a
simulation time of three years; however, I found that I would really have to double
the amount of information I had about how NPPs operate in order to do justice to
simulating a planned outage. In outages, NPPs operate under totally different rules,
and there are quite different dynamics and decision rules to take into account.
Therefore I decided to remove the portion of the model dealing with the outage and
concentrate on the portion of the model I had more confidence in.
Having a planned outage would likely emphasize the importance of all types
of preventive maintenance, as preventive maintenance decreases the number of
new defects entering the system. As broken down parts not discovered would be
discovered and added to the backlog during a planned outage, having fewer of those
broken down parts would likely decrease the length of the outage, and thus increase
the profitability of the plant. A planned outage would allow other types of
experimentation not now possible, such as seeing how altering the percentage of
broken down equipment discovered each week and going on the outage backlog
would change the length of the outage and the condition of the plant.
Second, explicitly incorporating quality in the model runs would be a helpful
step. Quality of maintenance is a major concern of those at Tyler, and hopefully at
all NPPs. The assumption used in these runs, that quality is 100%, may not be bad
compared to other assumptions inherent in the model (such as treating all pieces of
equipment the same). However, it would be nice to be able to alter the quality of
maintenance to see what impact it would have on the plant. This may eventually
give NPP managers some idea of exactly what each dollar they invest in increasing
maintenance quality gives them in terms of the overall functioning and condition
of the plant.
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Third, we would have liked to have expanded the model to include a safety
sector. The planned safety sector would perform a rough Probabilistic Risk
Assessment (PRA) based on the numbers of pieces of equipment in each category
(e.g. non-operating and defective). We would thus be able to see how the core
damage frequency changes over time as a result of the condition of the plant.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it would be very helpful to get more
information on the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) of an "average" piece of
equipment in an NPP, and to get a more quantitative estimate of at what rate each
piece of defective operating equipment causes pieces of perfectly operating
equipment to become defective. A rough bound could be set on these through
experimentation with the model. However, it would be much more satisfying to
have some independent estimate and test how the model operates with that
estimate. Those at Tyler One had no idea of either of these estimates, an interesting
piece of data in itself.
As can be seen, there is no shortage of tasks that could be undertaken to make
the.model more valid and more useful.
Use of Model at Tyler
We are giving a copy of the model to those who are most interested in it and
who would find the model the most useful: the work process control managers at
each site.
It is of course beyond the scope of this thesis, but it would be interesting to
check back with the work process managers to see if and how they are using the
model. They may find that the model brings up certain questions that it currently is
not addressing, and would like to see it adapted to address them. They may alter the
initial conditions of the model in ways which more accurately reflect their
maintenance organization, with the knowledge that only insiders of the system
have. The organization of maintenance may evolve, and require that changes be
made in the structure of the model.
To be absolutely honest, I predict that the most likely way this model will be
used is through examination of this thesis. I think that if MIT does not continue to
work on this project with those at Tyler One, the model itself will remain in the
depths of a hard drive, to be accessed once and forgotten.
The primary reason for my pessimism is that I have had no time to work on a
user interface. It would be great to be able to change parameters and initial
conditions in ways relevant to the decisions that the Work Process Control
managers, for example, have to make. But as it stands, one must spend some time
playing with the model and learning some about the System Dynamics modeling
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methodology to really be able to do any experimentation.
In addition, the model needs to have more features that are relevant to
decisions that need to be made at Tyler One. It should calculate how many
additional workers are needed to complete an outage on time, or to meet a target
backlog over a specified time, for example.
I also think that if those within Tyler, especially the Work Process Control
Managers, had worked with me to construct the model from the ground up, they
would have much greater confidence and appreciation for it. As it stands, some of
the categories of equipment, such as "defective equipment," don't make complete
sense to them, and if they had devised something themselves these sorts of
problems would not exist. However, given the fact that the distance between MIT
and Tyler made frequent face-to-face contact problematic, and that I found that the
Work Process Control Managers were really the ones I should speak with relatively
late in the project, I'm not sure what else I could have done.
Closing Remarks
I hope that this model will continue to generate discussion on what the
important parts of the system are, and how they interact together to produce the
overall system behavior. Its utility as a point of reference, as a language for
communication is evident to me from my interaction with those at Tyler.
I personally saw an impact of the model beyond the Work Process Control
Managers I was working with. A maintenance manager at Tyler One, on hearing
my presentation of the model and looking at the diagram, commented, "I think I'm
beginning to see the usefulness of SRT as an organization doing a high volume of
less complicated tasks." Previously he had seen it more as doing tasks rather similar
to those the regular maintenance teams would do. A representative from
headquarters deeply involved with designing SRT commented (after he left the
room), "I believe we've just had a breakthrough." And the interesting part about it
is that I don't think anything explicit in the way the model is formulated would lead
you to any conclusions about the types of jobs that SRT should do, as jobs are all
treated as the same. What had happened is that the model had provided a focal
point for discussion, and that everyone could use the model structure to make the
reasoning behind their viewpoints explicit.
I heard commented not once but several times that my understanding of
maintenance and the nuclear industry was astonishing for someone never having
worked in the industry. Almost all of that knowledge was gained over the course of
this project.
I believe strongly that if I had just interviewed people at Tyler with the aim of
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learning about their organization and maintenance at NPPs, I would not have
gained half of the knowledge and understanding I have over the course of this
project. The fact that I was creating a model meant that I was forced to ask questions
about what was important for the system, about how those important components
interact, and about actual numbers for the status of system.
The model has just as much potential to be used as a tool for communication
and learning within Tyler, and I hope it will be used as such.
The sciences and technology have make breathtaking advances in this
century, leading to the creation of new and better materials, gadgets, conveniences,
weapons, and medicines. However, it seems that there has been relatively little
progress in understanding the complicated systems upon which the economic well-
being, quality of life, and life itself of mankind depends.
The comparison is stark: we can genetically engineer an organism to eat
spilled crude oil, yet we cannot agree on whether a particular policy on health care
or welfare will even be beneficial.
It is argued that these types of systems are simply to complicated to analyze,
and that experience and instinct must be our guide. However, engineering once had
very little to do with science; building bridges didn't involve force and moment
calculations, but was a trial-and-error process where experience was the guide.
Medicine, likewise, was practiced before people knew what microbes and viruses
were, before they even knew that blood was a good thing.
Through more work on understanding systems, and on asking questions
which are truly important for mankind, it is my hope that what became true of
engineering and medicine will also become true of system and policy analysis. We
cannot afford not to try.
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Appendix A - Actual View of the Equipment Sector
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Appendix B -- Equations of the Model
Equipment Flows
BD Equipment(t) = BD_Equipment(t - dt) + (breakdown_rate +
disc_def_op_equip_bkdwn - discoveryrate) * dt
INIT BD_Equipment = 200
INFLOWS:
breakdown_rate = Def_Op_Equip*defect_bkdwn_length
{piece/weekl
disc_defopequip_bkdwn = defect_bkdwn_length*discdefop_equip
OUTFLOWS:
discoveryrate = BDEquipment*effectofPM_rate
Def_OpEquip(t) = Def_Op_Equip(t - dt) + (defectintro - defeq_detection_rate -
breakdown_rate - PM_def sched_rate) * dt
INIT DefOp_Equip = 1900
INFLOWS:
defect_intro =
(DefOp_Equip+disc_defop_equip)*:06+PerfOp_Equipment/(14*52)
OUTFLOWS:
def eq_detection_rate = .05*Def_Op_Equip
breakdown_rate = Def_Op_Equip*defect bkdwn_length
{piece/week)
PM def schedrate = Sched PM*PMOeffectiveness
Des_Maint_Bklog(t) = Des_Maint_Bklog(t - dt)
INIT DesMaint_Bklog = 1600
disc_BD_equip(t) = disc_BD_equip(t - dt) + (discovery_rate - BD_to_Maintenance -
BD_to_SRT) * dt
INIT disc_BD_equip = 150*dt
INFLOWS:
discovery_rate = BDEquipment*effectof_PM_rate
OUTFLOWS:
BD_to_Maintenance = ((1-Frac_BD_bySRT)*disc BD_equip/dt)
BD_to_SRT = Frac_BD_bySRT*disc_BD_equip/dt
disc_def_opequip(t) = disc_def_opequip(t - dt) + (def_eq_detection_rate -
PM_disc_def_sched_rate - disc_def_op_equip_bkdwn) * dt
INIT disc_defop_equip = 200
INFLOWS:
def_eq_detection_rate = .05*Def_OpEquip
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OUTFLOWS:
PM_disc_def_sched_rate = min(nextprioritycap,discdef opequip)
{check units here!}
disc_def_op_equip_bkdwn = defect_bkdwn_length*discdefop-equip
Equiptaken_down_for_PM(t) = Equip_takendown_for_PM(t - dt) +
(PMdisc_def_sched_rate + PM_Op_sched_rate + PM_def_sched_rate - PM_RTS)
* dt
INIT Equip_taken_down_for_PM = 181
INFLOWS:
PM_disc_def_sched_rate = min(nextpriority_cap,disc_defopequip)
{check units here!}
PM_Op_sched_rate = (1-PMO_effectiveness)*Sched_PM
PM_def sched_rate = Sched_PM*PMO_effectiveness
OUTFLOWS:
PM_RTS = total_PMs
Maintenance_repair(t) = Maintenance_repair(t - dt) + (BD_toMaintenance +
transfer - MaintRTS) * dt
INIT Maintenance_repair = 1600
INFLOWS:
BD_to_Maintenance = ((1-Frac_BD_by_SRT)*disc_BD_equip / dt)
transfer = MAX((SRT_repair+BD_to_SRT-S-SRRTS-max_SRT_backlog),0)
OUTFLOWS:
Maint_RTS = MIN((((Maintenance_repair-
Des_MAINT_bklog)/MAINT_bklogadj_time)+BD_to_Maintenance),Maintaftr
MandPMs)
Perf_Op_Equipment(t) = Perf_OpEquipment(t - dt) + (Maint_RTS + SRT_RTS +
PM_RTS - defectintro - PM_Op_sched_rate) * dt
INIT PerfOpEquipment = 102727+150-150*dt
INFLOWS:
Maint_RTS = MIN((((Maintenance_repair-
Des_MAINT_bklog) /MAINT_bklog_a d j_time)+BD_to_Maintenance),Maintaftr
MandPMs)
SRT_RTS = min(SRT_repair,max_SRT_jobs)
PM RTS = total_PMs
OUTFLOWS:
defect_intro =
(Def_Op_Equip+discdef_op_equip)*.06+PerfOp Equipment/(14*52)
PM_Op_sched_rate = (1-PMOeffectiveness)*Sched_PM
SRT_repair(t) = SRT_repair(t - dt) + (BDto_SRT - SRT_RTS - transfer) * dt
INIT SRTrepair = 42
INFLOWS:
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BD_to_SRT = Frac_BD_by_SRT*discBD_equip/dt
OUTFLOWS:
SRT_RTS = min(SRT_repair,maxSRT_jobs)
transfer = MAX((SRT_repair+BDto_SRT-SRT_RTS-max_SRT_backlog),0)
CMRTS = MaintRTS+SRT_RTS
defect_bkdwn_length = 1/14 {1/weeks}
Frac_BDby_SRT = .5
fracperf_equip = Perf_Op_Equipment/totalno_equip*100
last_priority_cap = next_priority_cap-PM_disc_def_sched_rate
Maint_aftr_MandPMs = (max_Maint_jobs-MandatoryPMs) {jobs/week}
MAINT_bklog_adj_time = 8 {weeks}
MandatoryPMs = 150 {pieces/wk}
max_SRT_backlog = 91/2 {pieces of equipment}
nextpriority_cap = Maint_aftr_MandPMs-Maint_RTS+max_SRTjobs-SRT_RTS
{jobs/wk}
percentPM = PM_RTS/(CMRTS+PMRTS)*100
percentProgrammed =
Sched_PM/(CM_RTS+PMdisc_def_schedrate+SchedPM)*100
PMO_effectiveness = .5
PM_timer = CYCLETIME(PMRTS,1)
Sched_PM = Mandatory_PMs+last_priority_cap
totalno_equip = 107000
totalPMs = Sched_PM+PM_disc_def_sched_rate
{pieces/wk}
effect_of_PM_rate = GRAPH(totalPMs)
(0.00, 0.3), (200, 0.635), (400, 0.79), (600, 0.875), (800, 0.93), (1000, 0.97), (1200, 0.985),
(1400, 0.985), (1600, 0.985), (1800, 0.99), (2000, 0.995)
Labor
Total_MAINT_wkrs(t) = Total_MAINT_wkrs(t - dt)
INIT TotalMAINT_wkrs = 150
avg_SRT_teamjobs_shft = 2
avg_workers_SRT_team = 2
max_Maint_jobs = Total_MAINT_wkrs*wkr_productivity*Wrkr_CapFactor
max_SRTjobs =
(SRT_wkrsper_shift/ avg_workers_SRT_team)*avg_SRT_team_jobs_shft*SRT-
shiftsper_wk
SRT_shifts_perwk = 14 (shifts/week)
SRT_wkrspershift = 6.5
wkr_productivity = 2 (jobs/week}
Wrkr_CapFactor = .8
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Outage
forced_outage = MONTECARLO(prob_of_forced_outage,37350)
Power_Production = 100*(1-forced_outage)
prob_of_forced_outage = GRAPH(frac_perf_equip)(0.00, 100), (1.00, 100), (2.00, 100), (3.00, 100), (4.00, 100), (5.00, 100), (6.00, 100), (7.00,
100), (8.00, 100), (9.00, 100), (10.0, 100), (11.0, 100), (12.0, 100), (13.0, 100), (14.0, 100),(15.0, 100), (16.0, 100), (17.0, 100), (18.0, 100), (19.0, 100), (20.0, 100), (21.0, 100), (22.0,
100), (23.0, 100), (24.0, 100), (25.0, 100), (26.0, 100), (27.0, 100), (28.0, 100), (29.0, 100),
(30.0, 100), (31.0, 100), (32.0, 100), (33.0, 100), (34.0, 100), (35.0, 100), (36.0, 100), (37.0,
100), (38.0, 100), (39.0, 100), (40.0, 100), (41.0, 100), (42.0, 100), (43.0, 100), (44.0, 100),
(45.0, 100), (46.0, 100), (47.0, 100), (48.0, 100), (49.0, 100), (50.0, 100), (51.0, 100), (52.0,
100), (53.0, 100), (54.0, 100), (55.0, 100), (56.0, 100), (57.0, 100), (58.0, 100), (59.0, 100),
(60.0, 100), (61.0, 100), (62.0, 100), (63.0, 100), (64.0, 100), (65.0, 100), (66.0, 100), (67.0,
100), (68.0, 100), (69.0, 100), (70.0, 100), (71.0, 100), (72.0, 100), (73.0, 100), (74.0, 100),
(75.0, 100), (76.0, 100), (77.0, 100), (78.0, 100), (79.0, 100), (80.0, 100), (81.0, 100), (82.0,
100), (83.0, 94.0), (84.0, 81.0), (85.0, 69.0), (86.0, 58.0), (87.0, 48.0), (88.0, 39.0), (89.0, 31.0),
(90.0, 24.0), (91.0, 17.0), (92.0, 12.0), (93.0, 8.00), (94.0, 5.00), (95.0, 3.00), (96.0, 2.00), (97.0,
1.50), (98.0, 1.00), (99.0, 0.5), (100, 0.25)
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Appendix C -- Major Points from the November Tyler Meeting
Points of Controversy
1. The process of examining and criticizing the model engendered a great deal of
discussion and debate over fundamental issues.
A. There was dispute over whether close-out time should be included in
measurements of cycle time for maintenance
B. There was disagreement over whether transferring SRT personnel to
maintenance would result in a change in the productivity of each worker in the
new, enlarged maintenance force.
C. There was a dispute about what causes forced outages: was it pure luck, or
was it some function of how the plant is run? Opinion was evenly split on this.
Tyler One manager - "It's all in attention to detail." Luck involved, but if properly
prepared luck tends to work in your favor.
Tyler Three manager - No, depends on totally random things. People are just
careless. There are human errors, regardless of the state of equipment in the plant.
2. There was surprise when I told the group that Tyler One personnel had told
me that there are 107,000 pieces of equipment in the plant. (Especially the Tyler One
manager, although I got this estimate from the person he recommended I call!)
They didn't volunteer any other numbers, however.
3. The Tyler Three manager felt that my switch insuring that SRT took no more
than 3 days' backlog was a "fix." If SRT took on average 42% of the incoming work
orders, then it should average 42% -- clearly wasn't averaging 42% with the switch.
There was some dissension: The Tyler One manager and second manager
from Tyler Three saw logic behind what I'd done -- they agreed that it made no sense
for SRT to build up backlogs like regular maintenance organization does.
4. There was a possible disagreement on the reason for outage length.
Tyler Three Manager -- many jobs now put off until outage could be safely
done in innage. (no one disputed this, but no one really enthusiastically chimed in,
either.) It is just tradition that says there is too high a dose in doing something, or
which says that you would put the plant in a risky configuration.
"If we only refueled, we could do it in 14-15 days." Tyler Three, second
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manager.
Agreements Within Group
5. There was consensus that the model needs to better capture how SRT adds
value to the process. Specifically, SRT rejects spurious orders that would normally
have occupied time in planning, scheduling, etc. before having been rejected.
6. ' I was informed that my assumption of a ten-man SRT shift, with an average
of 9 of those 10 present due to vacations, etc. was wrong. There have been layoffs,
and the average SRT shift is now 6-7 members. And a team of two men from SRT
can handle about 3-4 jobs a shift (but closer to 3).
7. They all agreed that assumptions about work priority need to be changed.
Most importantly, ALL PMs ARE MANDATORY. THERE ARE NO ELECTIVES.
So, when maintenance shoots for a lower CM backlog, they CANNOT take man-
hours away from PMs. (According to the Tyler Two maintenance manager, "You
can't rob from Peter to pay Paul.") How do you reduce the backlog? You must get
additional resources, be more creative with scheduling (do the CM jobs on the piece
of equipment currently taken down for PM, etc.).
Tyler One manager -- would be nice to have in the model a calculation of what
additional resources necessary.
8. They all disagreed with how I had defined working on defective operating
equipment as PM work. They defined it as CM. (But the Tyler One manager did
acknowledge that there were shades of gray in all of this...)
9. ALL felt that the model's parameter of 1 job per 2 man team on SRT was far
too low -- yet that was exactly what Prof. Carroll and I were told in Tyler
Headquarters by a team of two former maintenance workers. They felt that a better
estimate was closer to 3 or 4, and that the estimate of 1 was not a bad estimate for the
regular maintenance organization.
10. There seemed to be the feeling (especially by the Tyler Three second manager)
that the measurements now used at Tyler had become increasingly meaningless.
"Used to be, that with a cycle time less than 50 days for maintenance, you got a
decreasing backlog, and with a decreasing backlog you saw a decreasing cycle time.
Now you can have a decreasing backlog and and INCREASING cycle time!"
There was general agreement that the data would need to be altered in ways
relevant to the model. They felt that they can help me do that much better now that
they know what the model is about and what it is trying to do.
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Opinions on Uses of Model
11.- There was a feeling that a major application of the model could be to help
prove the effectiveness of SRT to those in the organization critical of it, and to those
outside the organization who are contemplating changes. It seems that some
current maintenance heads want their former staff back, and don't believe that SRT
has done all that much for the organization. There is no organized, concentrated
movement to get rid of SRT, but those present were definitely worried that one day
it might happen.
12. Another use for the model could be testing policies before implementing
them. One participant explicitly said that usually at Tyler, people just tried
something to see if it worked. He said that essentially people had gone on faith that
the SRT process would be better, and that they just happened to guess correctly. He
mentioned that for future change, it would be nice not to have to rely so completely
on faith, and that management should be interested in a tool such as the model.
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